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Comment
The Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity:
The Constitutionality of Student-Led Graduation
Prayer in Light of the Crumbling Wall Between
Church and State
I.

INTRODUCTION

Marian Ward had to bar the doors of her home because she was the
center of steadfast media attention and public scrutiny.1 She worried
that she might be the target of a gunman. 2 The Santa Fe High School
sophomore, a member of the National Honor Society and a talented
trumpet player in the school band,3 was threatened with sanctions from
her school and a local court.4 One Friday evening, when she arrived at
the traditional high school football game, Marian feared federal
marshals would "carry [her] away." 5 When she entered the stadium, she
passed news cameras and placards with messages such as "Prayer is
Private" and "Keep the Devil Out of Santa Fe." 6 Why the commotion?
Marian's peers selected her to compose and recite a traditional pre-game
7
prayer.
Across the country in Calvert County, Maryland, Nick Becker was
threatened with arrest and banned from attending his high school's postgraduation boat cruise. 8 Nick's mother kept his grandparents away
from the graduation ceremony because it would be too upsetting for
1. See Victoria Loe Hicks, New Football Match-up: Church v. State, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Nov. 7, 1999, at IA.
2. See id. Marian was reacting to a previous incident in Fort Worth, Texas, where a gunman
had killed those attending a Baptist youth service. See id.
3. See Paul Duggan, Texas Holy War on the Gridiron: PrayerBan Fuels Controversy, WASH.
POST, Oct. 10, 1999, at A3.
4. See Hicks, supra note 1, at IA.
5. See id.
6. See Duggan, supra note 3, at A3.
7. See id. Marian Ward stated: "Dear Heavenly Father, I pray [for] your presence in this stadium tonight. [I pray for] a good, clean and fun game, [and ask that] God keep us safe. In Jesus's name, Amen." Id.
8. See Lyndsey Layton, The Grad Who Got Religion, WASH. POST, June 22, 1999, at C1.
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them. 9 Why? Nick legally challenged the traditional recitation of
prayer during the ceremony because he is an agnostic.1 l The school
administration held a "moment of reflection" in place of prayer as a
result of Nick's actions. 11 When members of the audience
spontaneously recited the Lord's Prayer, however, Nick walked out of
12
his own graduation ceremony in protest.
Marian and Nick's experiences characterize a growing debate in the
nation's courts 13 heard throughout society: local schools,14
legislatures,1 5 political campaigns, 16 media outlets, 17 and private citizen
opinion polls. 18 Although public attention to the constitutionality of
9. See id. at C2.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See infra Part III (discussing the disagreement among the federal circuit courts of appeals
on the constitutionality of student-led prayer at public school graduation ceremonies).
14. In fact, after the Fifth Circuit decided Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District,
930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1992), students organized a "prayer-in" to protest. See Marc A. Brown,
Christmas Trees, Carols and Santa Claus: The Dichotomy of the First Amendment in Public
Schools and How the Implementation of a Religion Policy Affected a Community, 28 J.L. &
EDUC. 145, 152 n.45 (1999); infra Part III.A.1 (discussing Jones v. Clear Creek Independent
School District); see also Steve DiMeglio, Texas Lawmakers' Bill Would Allow Prayer Before
Kickoff, Gannet News Service, Oct. 20, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, News Group
File (stating that over 1000 Texas public high schools stopped prayer before games as a result of
Marian Ward's case).
15. See Sense of Congress Supporting Prayer at Public School Sporting Events, H.R. Con.
Res. 199, 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted) ("Prayers and invocations at public school sporting
events are constitutional under the First Amendment to the Constitution; and the Supreme Court,
accordingly, should uphold the constitutionality of such practices."); see also Jeremy Learning,
House Urges High Court to Support Prayer Before Public School Sporting Events, The Freedom
Forum On-Line (last modified Nov. 3, 1999) <http://www.freedomforum.org/religion/
1999/11/3houseres.asp>.
16. See Bush Asks Court to Reconsider Texas School Prayer Ruling, AP, Mar. 28, 1999,
available in LEXIS, News Library, AP File; see also Bauer Says JudicialElites at War with Religion in Public Life, U.S. Newswire, May 18, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wire
Service File.
17. See, e.g., Jeremy Southall, A Placefor Prayer, ATL. J. & CONST., Nov. 5, 1999, at 21A;
CNN Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 3, 1999) (transcriptavailable in LEXIS, News
Library, Transcript File); ABC News This Morning (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 12, 1999)
(transcriptavailable in LEXIS, News Library, Transcript File); Hardball with Chris Matthews:
Federal Appeals Court Rules that Alabama Students Can Pray Over a School's Public Address
System Under Some Limitations (CNBC television broadcast, July 21, 1999) (transcriptavailable
in LEXIS, News Library, Transcript File); Hardball with Chris Matthews: Whether Prayer
Should be Allowed in Public Schools (CNBC television broadcast, June 1, 1999) (transcript
available in LEXIS, News Library, Transcript File).
18. According to a recent Gallup poll, 83% of those surveyed favored allowing students to
recite prayers at graduation ceremonies. See Public Opinion Online, Gallup Organization, CNN,
U.S.A. Today Poll, July 9, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. Seventeen percent of those surveyed opposed prayer, and less than .5% had no opinion. See id.

2o00

The Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity

student-led prayer is now particularly strong, it is hardly a new
controversy. The role of religious expression in a democratic society
9
was a vexing problem for America's Founding Fathers.'
Acting under the shadow of the religious intolerance that sparked the
American Revolution, our nation's early leaders created the First
Amendment. 20 Two components of the First Amendment relate to
religion: the Free Exercise Clause states that citizens have freedom of
religious expression and belief, 2 1 and the Establishment Clause warns
that such expression is meant to be private and cannot be endorsed or
promoted by the government. 22 The First Amendment also houses the
Free Speech Clause, which affords citizens the freedom of private
expression on general topics. 23 Since the drafting of the First
Amendment, courts have attempted to strike a balance between these
clauses; the scale, however, has remained decidedly uneven. 24 Since
1940, seventy cases involving religious expression were heard before
the United States Supreme Court.25 A clear standard has yet to
26
emerge.
The Court is now at a critical juncture in its effort to find a balance
between church and state, especially within the setting of public
schools. 27 Before the 1999-2000 session, the Supreme Court reviewed
petitions for certiorari that involved issues ranging from religious
28
practice in public schools to taxpayer support for parochial education.
19. See KERN ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF SCHOOLS, STUDENTS AND TEACHERS IN A
NUTSHELL 98 (1984).
20. See id. ("The European experience of embattled Church and State was fresh in the minds
of the founding fathers in America when the First Amendment was drafted.").
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See infra Part 1I (discussing the development of First Amendment law).
25. See Lisa Langendorfer, Comment, Establishing a Pattern: An Analysis of the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 705, 705 (1999) ("The Establishment Clause has been greatly litigated, with more than seventy cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court since the 1940s, yet the Court has been unable to agree for any amount of
time on a standard method for determining if the Establishment Clause has been violated.").
26. See id.
27. See Brown, supra note 14, at 182 (arguing that the cases are "conflicting"); see also
Charles J. Russo, Prayer at Public School Graduation Ceremonies: An Exercise in Futility or a
Teachable Moment, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 3 ("Public education presents today's Court with
one of its greatest challenges as it interprets the religion clauses."); see also Learning, supra note
15.
28. The Court reviewed petitions considering taxpayer-paid vouchers for parochial school tuition. See Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that a policy providing high
school students who had no public education facilities with reimbursements for private school
tuition payments did not violate the Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 329 (1999);
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In addition, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve one of the
most controversial issues in education today: the appropriateness of
student-led prayer at high school graduation ceremonies and athletic
events. 29 The Supreme Court will review a case in which the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that students could offer non-sectarian
(but not proselytizing) prayer at graduation ceremonies, but refused to
extend that right to invocations at athletic contests.3 0 The Supreme
Court granted partial certiorari, however, and will decide only whether
pre-game prayer is constitutional.3 1 Consequently, the Court will leave
untouched the muddled area of graduation prayer. 32 Conflicting
opinions on the practice of student-led prayer at graduation ceremonies

Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999) (holding that a tuition funding statute
excluding reimbursement for parochial schools did not violate the Free Exercise, Establishment,
or Equal Protection Clauses), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 364 (1999). In addition, the Court considered cases involving tax credits for the support of private school education. See Kotterman v.
Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999) (holding that a state program providing tax credits up to $500
for donations to school tuition funds did not violate the Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 120
U.S. 283 (1999), and cert. denied sub noan. Rhodes v. Killian, 120 S. Ct. 42 (1999). The Court
also reviewed the establishment of school districts for particular religious sects. See Pataki v.
Grumet, 720 N.E.2d 66 (N.Y. 1999) (finding a New York statute allowing a religious sect, the
Kiryas Joel, to establish a separate district for their disabled children violative of the Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 363 (1999). The Court also reviewed the use of federally
funded computers and instructional materials for religious schools. See Helms v. Picard, 151
F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a program providing special education services by public
school teachers to parochial school children and program providing transportation to parochial
school students did not violate the Establishment Clause), cert. granted, Mitchell v. Helms, 119
S. Ct. 2336 (1999).
29. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.
Ct. 494 (1999).
30. See id.
31. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 494, 494 (1999) ("Petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted limited [review] of
the following question: Whether petitioner's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated
prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause.").
32. See Linda Greenhouse, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at A24. In fact, Texas courts are unevenly applying Santa Fe to graduation prayer. See House Urges High Court to Overturn Decision in Texas Prayer Case, AP, Oct. 21, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, AP File. Although the Santa Fe decision was cited by Judge John McBride in a Texas district court opinion
that disallowed graduation prayer, the Texas Attorney General disagreed with the district court
judge's interpretation. "The [Santa Fe] opinion does not prohibit students from engaging in voluntary prayer and should not be construed to prevent that type of activity as long as the school
and school officials are not involved," Id.
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stand within the Fifth,3 3 Ninth,34 Eleventh, 35 and Third Circuits.3 6 In
denying certiorari on the graduation prayer issue, the Supreme Court
denied the lower courts guidance on a genuine First Amendment
37
controversy among federal circuits.
This Comment will first address the general background of the
clauses in the First Amendment, tracing Establishment Clause, Free
Exercise and Free Speech jurisprudence historically and in light of the
public school setting. 38 Next, this Comment will outline the current
status of the law regarding student-led prayer in graduation ceremonies
among federal circuit courts. 39 This Comment will also consider the
application of traditional First Amendment doctrines to cases involving
student-led prayer at graduation ceremonies. 40 Finally, this Comment
will suggest a framework for courts to analyze student-led graduation
prayer cases and for schools to consider when implementing student41
initiated school prayer policies.
II.BACKGROUND
When the Founding Fathers wrote in the First Amendment,
42
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,"
("Establishment Clause"), they sought to quell the religious persecution
and intolerance that fed the fire of the American Revolution. 43 Within
33. See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 806; Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993); see also infra Parts III.B.2 (discussing Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe), III.A. 1 (discussing Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School
District).
34. See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998); Harris v. Joint Sch.
Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994); see also infra Parts III.A.2 (discussing Doe v. Madison School District No. 321), III.B. 1 (discussing Harris v. Joint School District No. 241).
35. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd.,
112 F.3d 1475 (11 th Cir. 1997); see also infra Part III.A.3 (discussing Chandler v. James), III.B.4
(discussing Adler v. Duval County School Board).
36. See ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996); see also
infra Part III.B.3 (discussing ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education).
37. See House Urges High Court to Overturn Decision in Texas Prayer Case, supra note 32.
38. See infra Part II (discussing the history and judicial interpretation of the Establishment
Clause).
39. See infra Part III (describing disparate approaches to student-led prayer in circuit courts).
40. See infra Part IV (contending that student-led prayer is unconstitutional under traditional
Establishment Clause or Free Speech analysis).
41. See infra Part V (suggesting alternative analysis for determining the constitutionality of
student-led prayer).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
43. See JOSEPH E. BRYSON & SAMUEL H. HOUSTON, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC
FUNDS FOR RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS: THE BURGER YEARS 1969-1986 27 (1990) ("For James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, religious freedom was the crux of the struggle for freedom in general."
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the same breath, however, they warned Congress that they "shall make
no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" 44 ("Free Exercise
Clause"), or "abridging the freedom of speech, 45 ("Free Speech
Clause"). These clauses presented a curious dichotomy. The Framers
limited the government's endorsement of religious beliefs and
simultaneously protected these same beliefs when uttered under the
guise of free religious speech via the Free Exercise or Free Speech
Clauses. 46 However, some aspects of the First Amendment are settled.
For example, it was established that, by definition, the Establishment
Clause primarily limits state action, 47 and the Free Speech Clause
protects private speech.48 Additionally, the Free Exercise Clause
49
compels exceptions to state policies that burden religious expression.
Although these distinctions among the Establishment Clause, the Free
Exercise Clause, and the Free Speech Clause seemed clear, discussion
50
over the meaning of the Clauses nevertheless began in earnest.
Scholars looked to the Founding Fathers to settle the debate. 5 1 There
was evidence that the Framers, especially Thomas Jefferson, aimed to

(citing ARVAL A. MORRIS, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 377 (1977))).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
45. Id.
46. See Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Drawing Lines in the Shifting Sand: Where Should the Establishment Wall Stand? Recent Developments in Establishment Clause Theory: Accommodation,
State Action, the Public Forum and PrivateReligious Speech, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
1, 1 (1998) ("Within the past sixty years, increased litigation in First Amendment jurisprudence
has shown the intrinsic tension that exists between the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses on
one hand and the Establishment Clause on the other."); see also JOHN H. GARVEY & FREDERICK
SCHAUER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER 394 (1992) ("The [Free Exercise and Establishment] clauses should be read as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as
a standard for action or inaction because these clauses, read together as they should be, prohibit
classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden." (quoting Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96 (1961))).
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress," as a representative body of the state,
may not establish religion).
48. See id. (stating that the state may not "abridge" the freedom of speech); see also Chad Allred, Guarding the Treasure: Protection of Student Religious Speech in the Classroom, 22
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 741, 764 (1999).
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that the state may not make a law that prohibits the free
exercise of religion).
50. See Ann E. Stockman, Comment and Note, ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of
Education: The Black Sheep of Graduation Prayer Cases, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1805, 1812 (1999)
(stating that "Establishment Clause jurisprudence has eroded into a guessing game for legislatures
and judges").
51. See generally RODNEY K. SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION (1987) (discussing modem public prayer jurisprudence in light of the writings of the Founding Fathers and
historical jurists).
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build an impenetrable wall separating church and state. 52 Equally
strong historical data suggested that the Clauses simply meant to
prohibit the development of a national religion.5 3 The dissonance of
this historical background thus has given no complete answer to the
original intent of the Framers 54 and has instead produced a body of law
that evidences the Court's struggle to reconcile the First Amendment
Clauses. 55 Thus, scholars have explored the First Amendment Clauses
in light of the differing opinions that have interpreted them over the past
56
two hundred and fifty years.
A. The Establishment Clause
1. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: Separation and
Accommodation
Drafted in 1789, the Establishment Clause intended to prohibit
government sponsorship of religious activities. 57 The Supreme Court,

52. Thomas Jefferson first established the metaphor of a "wall" separating church and state:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his
God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the legislative
powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions,-I contemplate with
sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their
legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and State.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Thomas Jefferson). John Adams,
however, described these clauses as dictating instead that "Congress will never meddle in religion." ALEXANDER, supra note 19, at 99.
53. See Stockman, supra note 50, at 1808. Commentators have noted that James Madison
intended that civil rights (such as religious rights) be preserved in light of government action. See
John E. Joiner, Note, A Page of History or a Volume of Logic? Reassessing the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 507, 509 (1996) (quoting Madison:
"The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any
national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed."); see also THERESA L. DONOVAN ET AL., VOLUNTARY SCHOOL
PRAYER: JUDICIAL DILEMMA, PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 9 (1995) (stating that the Establishment
Clause was intended to prevent a "National ecclesiastical establishment") (citing JOSEPH STORY
II1, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1871 (1833)); id. (stating that "historical data does
not support the theory that the First Amendment was adopted to ensure an absolute separation of
church and state").
54. See SMITH, supra note 51, at 7.
55. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 263 (1998) ("[These cases] are an impossible tangle of divergent doctrines and seemingly conflicting results."); see also Board of
Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) ("[T]here is a crucial difference between government
speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.").
56. See Ansson, supra note 46, at 1.
57. See BRYSON & HOUSTON, supra note 43, at 27 (stating that the purpose of the First
Amendment was the "complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and
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however, did not directly consider the Establishment Clause until
1947.58 In Everson v. Board of Education,59 the Court reviewed a New
Jersey policy that reimbursed parents for their children's bus
transportation to private, religious, and public schools. 60 After holding
that the Establishment Clause applied to the states through the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 1 the Court invoked
Thomas Jefferson's "wall" between church and state and expressed
concern about government assistance to children who attended religious
schools. 62 Nonetheless, the Court decided to allow the extension of
63
these state subsidies to religious schools.
The most far-reaching impact 64 of the Everson decision was the
endorsement of government neutrality toward religion. 65 The Everson
Court characterized the subsidies as standard state benefits that only
indirectly touched religious schools. 66 The cautious Court warned that
citizens should not be denied these regular benefits because of an
"overzealous" enforcement of the Establishment Clause. 67 Rather,
civil authority").
58. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 1 (1947). While Everson was not the first case
to explore the Establishment Clause, it was the first to do so exclusively. See SMITH, supra note
51, at 125 n.10.
59. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
60. See id. at 3.
61. See id. at 15.
62. See id. at 18 (declaring that the wall "must be kept high and impregnable"). But see id. at
29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority had allowed the wall between church
and state to be lowered).
63. See id. at 16-17.
64. See Stockman, supra note 50, at 1811 (discussing the Supreme Court's incorporation of
the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process guarantees).
65. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 ("[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in
its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be
their adversary."). A similar rationale was used in Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School District.
Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 831 (5th Cir. 1999) (Jolly, J.,
dissenting). The
dissent suggested that the Constitution requires "an essentially neutral directive of accommodation for private religious and other speech ...." Id. (Jolly, J., dissenting); see also generally
Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty, Equality, and Free
Speech Values-A Critical Analysis of "Neutrality Theory" and Charitable Choice, 13 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 243 (1999) (providing an in-depth critical analysis of the neutrality theory and its implications in charitable choice).
66. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
67. See id. at 16. Later Court decisions support this decision. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 60 (1985); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 79293 (1973) ("A proper respect for both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses compels the
state[s] to pursue a course of neutrality ....");Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)
("We find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to
religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence.").
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Justice Black focused on the fact that the policy assisted in the
transportation of children attending any accredited school and did not
directly fund or support religious schools. 68 Based upon these facts, the
Court held that the policy was neutral toward religion and did not
69
violate the Establishment Clause.
The Court's decision to endorse government neutrality was important
because it allowed an indirect governmental benefit to children
attending religious schools. 70 It did not, however, signal the start of a
crumbling of Jefferson's wall. The Court re-emphasized this wall one
year after Everson when it deemed unconstitutional a policy allowing
religious classes to be held in public school buildings. In Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education,7 1 the Court determined that allowing
clergy to use public school facilities for religious instruction moved far
closer to the government support of religion than did the policy in
Everson.72 Justice Frankfurter said, "'the great American principle of
eternal separation' . . . is one of the vital reliances of our Constitutional
system. . . . It is the Court's duty to enforce this principle in its full
integrity." 73 Thus, the first Establishment Clause cases evidenced the
Court's stance of separation, unless a government policy was clearly
74
neutral, as in Everson.
The Court soon softened its separationist stance, however, and moved
toward a philosophy of accommodation.75 In Zorach v. Clauson,76 the
Court permitted a policy that allowed students to be released from a
68. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
69. See Stockman, supra note 50, at 1811-12 (discussing the shift of the Everson case towards
invalidating government support of religion).
70. See Brownstein, supra note 65, at 245 (arguing that neutrality "maximizes religious liberty").
71. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948) (holding that
religious classes held in public school buildings outside of class time are unconstitutional and
using Thomas Jefferson's metaphor of the wall between church and state to evoke Robert Frost's
phrase "good fences make good neighbors"). Justice Frankfurter also articulated the importance
of keeping First Amendment law clear in public schools:
The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive
means for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of the State is it more vital to
keep out divisive forces than in its schools, to avoid confusing, not to say fusing, what
the Constitution sought to keep strictly apart.
Id. at 231.
72. See id. at 209-11.
73. Id. at 231.
74. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (asserting that the First
Amendment requires neutrality).
75. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 269-71 (discussing the separationist versus accommodationist views).
76. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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public school building during the day in order to attend religious
classes. 77 The Court referenced its prior holding in Everson when it
announced its departure from a strict separationist view. 78 The Court
went further than Everson, however, and accepted a state policy with an
79
accomodationist stance towards religion.
In lowering Jefferson's wall, the Court first noted that the First
Amendment does not say that in "every and all respect[s] there shall be
a separation of church and state." 80 Instead, it suggested that only
where there was a genuine tension between religious expression and
government indoctrination must the separation "be complete and
unequivocal.'
Citing a nation of religious citizens, the Court
rationalized its holding and new accomodationist stance. 82 In language
that suggested a special consideration for the religious needs of
students, the Court remarked that United States citizens were "religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." 83 Justice
Douglas wrote that without accommodation of religious needs, the
Court would "show a callous indifference to religious groups" and the
historical underpinnings on which our country is based.84 The Court
found that the policy allowing student dismissals for religious education
did not engender tension because the classes were held outside of the
85
public school building and did not require administrative involvement.
The Court, however, did not suggest a permissible response in the event
86
this tension would arise.
Thus, the Court presented two lines of Establishment Clause cases:
one compelling strict separation between religion and the state and the
87
other supporting accommodation of religious expression and practice.
The Court left unclear, however, where permissible accommodation

77. See id. at 309-11 (holding that students must leave the public school setting in order for
religious instruction to occur).
78. See id. at 312 (referencing the "separation of Church and State in the history of the Bill of
Rights and in the decisions clustering around the First Amendment").
79. See id. at 313.
80. Id. at 312.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 313.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 314. Justice Douglas also suggested that such an interpretation would create a situation where churches would not pay property taxes, the phrase "so help me God" would not be part
of courtroom oaths, etc. See id. at 312-13.
85. See id. at 315.
86. See id.
87. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 268 (discussing the two lines of Establishment Clause
cases).
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might end and separation might begin. 88 In fact, the Court's balancing
of accommodation and separation continued for almost two decades,
and a clear standard of analysis did not emerge until 197 1.89
2. The Lemon Test Emerges
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,90 the Court synthesized these lines of
Establishment Clause cases 9 1 and produced a new test. 92 In Lemon, the
Court declared that provisions of two state statutes providing publicly
financed instructional aids and other disbursements to religious schools
were unconstitutional.9 3 The Court struck down the statutes because
they presented government "sponsorship, financial support and active
involvement" in religious activities. 94 The Court presented three
requirements for a permissible government policy that involved
religion. 95 First, the state must have a "secular legislative purpose"
when enacting a policy. 96 Second, the policy must have a neutral effect
on religion and "its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion." 97 Third, the state must not create "an
excessive government entanglement with religion" when it administers
98
the policy.
Although the three requirements themselves established a significant
"test," the Court's rationale behind this test proved to be instructive to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence as well. 99 In the first part of the
test, the Court sought to uncover policies that contained religiously
neutral language but were really conceived to promote religious
activity."
The Court therefore looked to the legislative history of the
88. See id. ("In the two decades after Everson, the Court seemed to oscillate between these
two attitudes.").
89. See id.; see also Stockman, supra note 50, at 1812 (noting that "[t]he relatively easy and
unifying principles that had emerged from early Establishment Clause jurisprudence had eroded
into a guessing game for legislatures and judges").
90. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
91. See ALEXANDER, supra note 19, at 101 (suggesting that Lemon was a hybrid of various
pre-determined tests); see also FARBER, supra note 55, at 268 (stating that Lemon "made senseof previous Establishment Clause cases and was a "synthesis" of such precedent).
92. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
93. See id. at 611,625.
94. Id. at 612 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. ld. at 612-13.
98. Id. (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
99. See Stockman, supra note 50, at 1812-14 (referring to the Lemon test as the first "comprehensive" test for the Establishment Clause).
100. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
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state policies in order to determine their purpose.' 0' The second part of
the test considered the effect of implementing the policy.10 2 The Court
evaluated the policy's practical effects and the way they might be
viewed by the public.1 03 With this part of the test, the Court tried to
draw a distinction between policies such as in Zorach, which simply
accommodated religion, versus programs that would be viewed as
religious promotion by the state. 10 4 Similarly, the Court considered the
role the state and its actors might play in such a policy in the third part
of the test. 10 5 The Court sought to avoid policies where the state
entity's level of supervision and oversight was too closely related to a
religious activity. 10 6 In order to maintain its constitutionality, a policy
10 7
could not excessively "entangle" the state with a religious exercise.
In effect, the Court in Lemon retreated from its earlier separationist
stance and allowed a slight weakening of Jefferson's wall between
church and state. 10 8 Indeed, the Lemon Court acknowledged that "the
line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct and
variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular

relationship."l°09

3. Lemon's Inefficacy: Alternative Tests of Endorsement
and Coercion Emerge
Lemon set a new guideline for Establishment Clause analysis and
sought to resolve the Court's fluctuation between separation and
accommodation."l 0 As the Lemon Court noted, however, the test left a
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. Justice O'Connor later noted that such a consideration is to be made irrespective
of the government's actual [or articulated] purpose. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
104. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 272.
105. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-14.
106. See id. at 613.
107. See id. The Court later suggested that the second and third prongs of the Lemon test be
combined, as they invoke similar factual analyses. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-34
(1997) (holding that publicly funded instructional materials were allowed in religious schools and
rejecting the presumption that having public school employees at parochial schools advances religious effect).
108. See generally Ansson, supra note 46 (illustrating the recent shift in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence).
109. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
110. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (suggesting that Lemon is only a "helpful
signpos[t]" or guideline to assist the Court (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)));
see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (refusing to be "confined to a single test or
criterion"); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 n.31
(1973) (referring to the established tests as guidelines).
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blurred picture of the wall between church and state.1 11 As a result,
12
subsequent Establishment Clause cases defined a period of confused"
and uneven results. 113 Thus, certain Supreme Court Justices have since
suggested alternative tests because of their discomfort with Lemon's
application. 114
Justice O'Connor suggested an alternative for the first two parts of
115
the Lemon test in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.
O'Connor concluded that a policy that essentially provided for
government endorsement of religion was impermissible.11 6 O'Connor
suggested that courts consider "both the subjective and the objective
components of the message communicated by [the] government['s]
action." 1 1 7 This so-called "endorsement test"' 1 8 prohibited policies that
allowed "government [to make] adherence to a religion relevant in any
way to a person's standing in the political community."'' 9 In effect,
O'Connor sought to prohibit policies that gave more political rights to
certain citizens simply due to their religious beliefs. 120 Because of the
endorsement test's subjective nature, the Court has struggled to draw a

11.See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
112. For example, the Court has come to disparate conclusions regarding the public funding of
instructional materials for parochial schools that Lemon prohibited. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at
220-21 (holding that program providing remedial education to children in parochial schools did
not violate the Establishment Clause); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985), overruled by
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203. Commentators have remarked that the Agostini decision reflects a
court "anxious" about denying public services to children, similar to Everson. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 269-70 (providing an analysis of these cases as exemplifying the current Establishment Clause divide).
113. See Bryan D. LeMoine, Note, Changing Interpretationsof the Establishment Clause:
FinancialSupport of Religious Schools, 64 MO. L. REV. 709, 715-24 (1999).
114. See Langendorfer, supra note 25, at 710-24 (outlining each of the Justices' views on Establishment Clause jurisprudence); see also Hugh Baxter, Managing Legal Change: The Transformation of EstablishmentClause Law, 46 UCLA L. REV. 343, 385-89 (1998).
115. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. See id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Establishment Clause jurisprudence required clarification in a case holding that a nativity scene in a city Christmas display
was permissible). Justice O'Connor noted, "[w]hat is crucial is that a government practice not
have the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that effect.., that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the political community." Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
118. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 272.
119. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor warned against
policies that send "a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community." Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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distinction between impermissible endorsement and some sort of
12 1
permissible religious accommodation.
Taking Justice O'Connor's lead, Justice Kennedy suggested an
122
alternative test in his concurring opinion to Allegheny v. ACLU.
Kennedy stated that the majority expressed a "hostility" towards
religion and took the Establishment Clause too far when it used
Lemon's three principles to reach the conclusion of forbidding a creche
in a county courthouse. 123 He proposed instead that two principles
control a state policy: (1) the government cannot coerce participation in
a religious exercise, and (2) it cannot tend to create a state religion
through its sponsorship of religious expression. 124 Applying these
principles, Kennedy concluded that the mere presence of a holiday
creche in a courthouse was not unconstitutional because employees
were not forced or coerced to participate in religion but could simply
walk by the display. 125 He further concluded that allowing space for a
religious symbol did not rise to the level of impermissible state
26
sponsorship of prayer. 1
As with the Lemon test and Justice O'Connor's endorsement test,
Justice Kennedy's test is difficult to apply. 127 In particular, Justice
Kennedy's test has been criticized because of the complex process of
ascertaining and considering whether the general public feels coerced to
participate in religious expression. 128 Critics contend that Kennedy's
requirement of consideration goes far beyond a mere analysis of what
the public might view or hear. 129 Instead, it involves an analysis of
121. The endorsement test has been utilized subsequent to Lynch. See generally Agostini v.
Fenton, 521 U.S. 203, 241 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting); Capital Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773-74 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 592-93 (1989); Texas Monthly Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985). The test, however, has been critized as too difficult to apply. See
FARBER, supra note 55, at 273.
122. Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 599 (1999) (holding that the display of a creche in a
county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause but that the display of a Menorah on a city
common did not). But see id. at 654 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting
in part) (suggesting that the public placement of neither symbol violated the Establishment
Clause).
123. See id. at 656 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part).
124. See id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part).
125. See id. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part).
126. See id. at 667 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part).
127. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 274. "[Iln part because the concept of coercion is pliable,
the test has not always been easy to apply. Reasonable people may differ on what is coercive,
and where the majority group sees only as invitation a religious minority may see an offer it can't
refuse." Id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
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psychological and emotional coercion that is difficult to ascertain and
130
far too vague to be judicially effective.
4. Establishment Clause Analysis of School Prayer
Subsequent application of the various Establishment Clause tests
131
proved to be as ineffective and uneven as the use of the Lemon test.
The Court's contemplation of policies implicating religion and prayer in
a school setting serves as a good example of this difficulty. As early as
1925, the Court began to define the relationship between religion and
public education.1 32 In the first case that contemplated this relationship,
the Court allowed state compulsory attendance requirements to be
satisfied by religious, rather than public schools. 133 The Court failed to
carefully examine the Establishment Clause, however, and instead cited
the liberty interest of parents to direct the quality of their children's
34
schooling. 1
The Court first considered the issue of school prayer in 1962 in Engel
v. Vitale, 135 where the Court applied the Establishment Clause to a
school setting. 136 The Court held that a public school could neither
compose daily invocations for students 37 nor promote a schoolsponsored religious activity. 138 Engel was heard before Lemon v.
Kurtzman, and thus did not apply the Lemon three part Establishment
Clause test for constitutionality. 139 Instead, the Court articulated a
traditional separationist view between church and state 140 and found that
the policy in question was constitutionally impermissible. 141 The Court

130. See id. But see Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 n.1 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
in part, dissenting in part) (stating that coercion in circumstances such as voluntary prayer is still
accomplished in an "indirect manner"). Kennedy finds no consistency between Marsh v. Chambers, where prayer opening legislative sessions was found constitutional, and Allegheny, where a
creche in a court building was found unconstitutional. See id. at 665 n.4 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment in part, dissenting in part).
131. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 274-82.
132. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 513 (1925).
133. See id. at 535-36 (holding that a state compulsory education statute requiring children to
attend public schools was unconstitutional).
134. See id. at 534-35.
135. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
136. Seeid. at425.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 435-36.
139. See id. at 421.
140. See id. at 430-31. The Court stated, "[The Establishment Clause's] first and most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy govemnment and degrade religion." Id. at 431.
141. See id. at 425. The Court concluded that "it is no part of the business of government to
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disregarded the voluntary nature of student participation and instead
found that the very presence of a prayer written and endorsed by public
school teachers would constitute state sponsorship of religious
expression. 142 In addition, the Court looked beyond the facts of the case
before it and voiced a concern about the direction of Establishment
43
Clause jurisprudence. 1
Subsequently, in other cases, the Court warned that the affirmation of
a similar school policy would begin a "trickling stream" that would
soon become a "raging torrent," overtaking the wall between church and
state. 144 In School District of Abington v. Schempp, 145 the Court held
that school policies that allowed Bible reading and other forms of prayer
were unconstitutional. 146 Such prohibition of prayer composed or
sponsored by school employees is now one of the strongest and most
uniform areas of Establishment Clause law, a primary example of the
147
Court's effort to keep the wall between church and state solid.
School districts reacted to this general prohibition of prayer by
instituting moments of silence in place of formal prayer. 14 8 Districts
argued that since students would be free to reflect in any way during
that time, religious or not, their policies epitomized the type of
neutrality toward religion that the Court had embraced in cases like
Everson.149 School district reliance upon the line of cases embracing
neutrality and accommodation was ill-timed, however, as the Court had

compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious
program carried on by government." Id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 430 (stating that state court approval of programs endorsing nondenominational prayer "ignores the essential nature of the program's constitutional defects" even
when students are not required to participate).
144. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 275 ("[This policy is a] trickling stream [that] may all too
soon become a raging torrent." (quoting School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963))).
145. School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
146. See id. at 225.
147. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 275 (noting that the prohibition of directed school prayer
is a "benchmark" of the Court's rulings in this area).
148. See David Z. Seide, Daily Moments of Silence in Public Schools: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 364, 364 (1983). For lower courts' discussions dealing with the moment
of silence issue, see generally May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561 (D.N.J. 1983); Duffy v. Las
Cruces Pub. Schs., 557 F. Supp. 1013 (D.N.M. 1983); Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161
(M.D. Tenn. 1982); Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (S.D. Ala. 1982); Gaines v. Anderson, 421
F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976).
149. See Seide, supra note 148, at 364; see also supra Part II.A.1 (discussing Establishment
Clause cases that showed the Court's willingness to uphold policies that either were neutral toward religion or simply accommodated religious expression).
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just adopted the Lemon three part test. 150 In a moment of silence case,
Wallace v. Jaffree,151 the Court looked to the policy's purpose, effect,
and potential church-state entanglement and concluded that moments of
silence were unconstitutional. 152 The particular policy presented in
Wallace failed the Lemon test for two reasons.' 53 The Court found a
clear non-secular purpose to the policy because the school district
intended to create a forum for student religious thought and
expression. 154 In addition, the Court posited that the effect of the policy
55
would be to promote religious expression within the school setting. 1
The Court, however, left the door open a crack on moments of
silence. In dicta, the Court distinguished the facts of Wallace, noting
that if a school district truly did not have a religious intent, but instead
implemented a moment of silence policy simply to allow students to
reflect in a general manner, it might be permissible as a policy neutral to
56
religious expression. 1
5. The Court Considers Graduation Prayer
Despite the opening presented in the Wallace decision, the prevailing
standard for school prayer issues remained the separation approach of
Engel v. Vitale and the test articulated in Lemon. 157 In 1992, however,
150. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see also supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the development of the Lemon test).
151. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
152. See id.
153. See id. at 38-39.
154. See id. at 59.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 65-66 (Powell, J., concurring). Commentators have noted that moments of silence should be constitutionally permissible. See Jesse H. Choper, Religion in the Public
Schools: A Proposed ConstitutionalStandard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329, 371 (1962); Seide, supra
note 148, at 368 (citing LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6, at 828-29
(1978)).
157. See DONOVAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 45 (stating that not much happened after Engel
before Lemon). Before the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lee v. Weisman, however, there
were a number of lower court opinions that interpreted the Lemon standard of the role of religion
in schools. See id. at 51-54; see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that placing
the Ten Commandments on walls in public schools violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment); Collins v. Chandler, 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a school policy allowing student prayer at voluntary school assemblies violated the Establishment Clause and rejecting Free Speech and Free Exercise grounds, stating that students could practice their religious
beliefs at other times during the day); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding the school board's refusal to allow student-organized communal prayer meetings on
school premises did not violate Free Exercise, Free Speech, Freedom of Association, or Equal
Protection Clauses). See generally DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community Sch. Dist., 384 F.2d
836 (7th Cir. 1967) (holding that a kindergarten class recital of a verse expressing thanks but not
mentioning to whom was a prayer and was not protected under the First Amendment when re-
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the Court again considered the issue in Lee v. Weisman.158 The Court
examined a policy allowing clergy to deliver invocations and
benedictions at school graduation ceremonies provided that the
principal first reviewed the content. 159 Because the clergy member was
a private citizen, the school district distinguished earlier cases that
prohibited prayer led by school employees. The Court disagreed,
however, and concluded that the clergy member acted in a manner
attributable to the state. 16° The Court reasoned that a school may not
avoid the prohibition of school-sponsored prayer by having an outsider
perform the prayer. 161 Thus, it concluded that the Establishment Clause
62
was the proper form of analysis. 1
Lee is an example of the Court's dissatisfaction with the Lemon
test. 163 The Court did not use Lemon but instead used Justice
Kennedy's coercion test. 164 Thus, the Court considered whether prayer
at graduation ceremonies, promoted by the school policy, created a
state-sponsored coercive environment. 165
Generally, the Court
identified the policy as coercive because the students in attendance
would be involuntarily subjected to religious speech. 166 On the other
hand, the school district argued that students were not coerced to
participate or hear the prayer because a student's attendance at the
ceremony was officially voluntary. 167 The Court disagreed and argued
that the importance of a student's graduation practically compelled his
68
or her attendance even if it was not mandatory. 1
In addition, the Supreme Court suggested that the principal's role in
reviewing and advising the religious speaker had two impermissible
quired in school); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965) (enjoining school officials from
preventing student-initiated recitation of prayers and holding constitutional rights to free exercise
and free speech do not require a state to permit student-initiated prayer in public schools).
158. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); see also Ralph D. Mawdsley, Student Choice and
GraduationPrayer: Division Among the Circuits, 129 EDUC. L. REP. 553, 553 (1998).
159. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 577.
160. See id. at 587.
161. See id. at 586-90.
162. See id. at 599.
163. See id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Scalia deemed the Lemon test
effectively interned: "The Court today demonstrates the irrelevance of Lemon by essentially ignoring it ... and the interment of that case may be the one happy byproduct of the Court's otherwise lamentable decision." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. See id. at 587; see also supra Part II.A.3 (discussing alternatives to Lemon, including the
coercion test first set forth in Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)).
165. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
166. See id. at 593-94.
167. See id. at 594-95.
168. See id. at 595.
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results. 169 First, the Court considered such participation to be state
control of religious speech, which it deemed unconstitutional in Engel v.
Vitale. 170 Second, the Court held that students viewed the school
official's participation in reviewing prayer as "inducing a participation
they might otherwise reject."' 17 1 On both these points, Justice Kennedy
discussed the susceptibility of young people to such messages of
authority and stated in dicta that the same might not be true for an
72
audience of university-aged students. 1
Finally, the Court distinguished a line of cases relied upon by the
school district that allowed invocations during legislative sessions. 173 In
Marsh v. Chambers,174 the Court upheld a Nebraska practice of hiring a
clergy member to pray before legislative sessions. 175 The Lee Court
distinguished Marsh and reasoned that the special setting of a school
and the young age of the intended audience allowed a different
analysis. 176 Specifically, the Lee Court characterized Marsh as an
exceptional circumstance, emphasizing the historical practice
of
178
legislative prayer 177 and the mature age of the audience members.

169. See id. at 588.
170. See id.; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
171. Lee, 505 U.S. at 590; see also FARBER, supra note 55, at 277 ("[G]iven the generally
authoritative nature of public schools, any official connection with religion easily is labeled as
coercive.").
172. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593-94 (citing psychological reviews and articles on child peer pressure).
173. See id. at 596-97 (distinguishing Marsh v. Chambers on the basis of numerous fundamental differences between the public school and state legislative environments).
174. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
175. See id. at 786.
176. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 597. In rebuffing an Establishment Clause challenge to the policy,
the Marsh Court said that unlike school prayer, the content of the speech was not important because it was not intended to be exploitative or proselytizing. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791. In
fact, the Court has refused to extend Marsh's rationale. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 597. Furthermore, a
recent circuit court case prohibited an Ohio school board from beginning meetings with an invocation. See Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 371 (6th Cir. 1999). The court held
that the policy failed the three prongs of the Lemon test. See id. at 384-85; see also Sixth Circuit
Halts Ohio School Board's PrayerPractice, SCH. L. BULL., May 1999, at 1, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Newsletter Stories File.
177. Indeed, the Court warned that Marsh might not apply in situations where there is no historical tradition of prayer. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786-89. "Historical evidence sheds light upon
what draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean." Id. at 790. But see SMITH, supra
note 51, at 240-41 nn.14-15 (noting that some of the Founding Fathers, such as Madison and
Franklin, disagreed as to the appropriateness of legislative prayer).
178. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 597-98.
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B. Alternative Modes of Analysis: Free Exercise and Free Speech
The analysis of school prayer issues has almost exclusively fallen
under the realm of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 179 in large part
because the cases have involved state policies implemented or
administrated by state employees. 180
In response, courts have
concluded that policies directing teachers or students to pray in school
settings are appropriately analyzed as state-sponsored
activities that
18
might contribute to the establishment of religion. 1
Commentators and jurists or judges, including Justice O'Connor and
Justice Scalia, have suggested that a Free Exercise or Free Speech
analysis may also be an appropriate way to approach student-led school
prayer issues, 182 and that a student's religious speech in a classroom is
not state-sponsored, but rather private speech. 183 They argue that, for
this reason, the Establishment Clause is an inappropriate form of
analysis. 184 Indeed, Justice O'Connor declared that student-led prayer
is private religious speech and may be fully protected by both the Free
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the Constitution. 185 Additionally,
Justice Scalia suggested that a private speaker's ability to conduct
religious speech in a public forum is not an Establishment Clause
violation. 186 He found that public religious expression does not violate
187
the Establishment Clause if it is made by a private citizen.

179. See supra Part I.A.4 (discussing school prayer and the Establishment Clause).
180. See Russo, supra note 27, at 4 (discussing the consistency of Establishment Clause jurisprudence concerning school prayer).
181. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding state officials cannot compose an
official state prayer and require its recitation at the start of each school day even if students are
not required to participate).
182. See Rick A. Swanson, Time for a Change: Analyzing GraduationInvocations and Benedictions Under Religiously Neutral Principles of the Public Forum, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1405,
1412 (1996) (emphasizing that Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect private speech that
endorses religion). In addition, Justice Kennedy has remarked that the Free Exercise Clause is a
natural counterpart to the Establishment Clause, in saying "[t]he Free Exercise [Cilause embraces
a freedom of conscience and worship that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First
Amendment, but the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on forms of state intervention
in religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the speech provisions." Lee, 505 U.S. at 591
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 n.127 (1976)).
183. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11 th Cir. 1999).
184. See id.
185. See id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1992) (majority opinion
written by Justice 0' Connor)).
186. See Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995).
187. See id.
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1. Free Exercise

The Free Exercise Clause reads: "Congress shall make no law...
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].' 8 8 Thus, government policy
may not unreasonably restrict "religious proselytizing, or even acts of
worship."' 8 9 Traditionally, the Free Exercise Clause has been invoked
to provide exemptions to government policies that substantially burden
religion. 190 In order for a particular policy to be found permissible, the
state must demonstrate a compelling interest for its enactment and must
narrowly tailor its policy to meet that stated interest.' 91
The Supreme Court first found that a government policy
unreasonably restricted the free exercise of religious belief in Sherbert
v. Verner.192 In that case, the Court found that the State wrongly denied
a Seventh-day Adventist unemployment benefits because she had
refused to accept jobs that required work on Saturday based upon her
religious beliefs. 19 3 The Court posited that such a situation forced the
employee to choose between economic stability and her religious beliefs
94
and that the State did not demonstrate a compelling interest.1
Soon after, Free Exercise jurisprudence extended to the issue of
religion in schools. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 195 the Court determined that
Amish children could be exempted from laws compelling compulsory
education in public schools after eighth grade. 196 The Court allowed
this because the Amish were educating their children outside of the
public schools in ways more pertinent to the Amish society. 197 In its
opinion, the Court balanced the compelling interest of the State in
providing education with Amish religious beliefs.' 98 It found that a
public school policy compelling Amish children to attend "worldly"
public schools in stark contrast to the Amish way of life overburdened
Amish religious beliefs. 199 The Court determined that although the
188. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
189. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 760 (citation omitted).
190. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 243 (stating Free Exercise considers "the extent to which
religious practices are entitled to exemption from general legal requirements").
191. See id. at 249.
192. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
193. See id. at 410.
194. See id. at 406-07.
195. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
196. See id. at 234.
197. See id. at 235-36. The Court held that the Amish provide an "'ideal' vocational education for their children" in this alternative setting. Id. at 224.
198. See id. at 234.
199. See id. at 217-18; see also id. at 231-32 (balancing the interest of Amish parents to direct
their child's education with the interest of the state to compel education for all children).
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State did have a compelling interest in educating children, a policy of
forcing Amish children to attend the last few years of school was not
"narrowly tailored" to meet that particular interest. z°
This opinion, however, has been criticized because it granted an
exception to one particular religious denomination that it probably
would not grant to other secular or religious groups. 20 1 Critics argue
that Yoder endorsed a policy that was not neutral because it failed to
benefit all children or religions equally. 20 2 Instead, the policy (and the
Court) "preferred" certain religions over others. 20 3 As a result of this
lack of neutrality in state policy and the Court's deference to the Amish
religion, some suggest the decision may have been a violation of the
24
Establishment Clause. 0
The Court used the compelling state interest test from Sherbert and
Yoder for twenty-seven years, but abandoned it in 1990.205 While some
argue this shift occurred because the compelling state interest test rarely
resulted in religious exemptions, 2°6 the only area where the Court made
such allowances was unemployment compensation. 20 7 In Employment
Division v. Smith,2 °8 Justice Scalia rejected the compelling state interest
test and wrote that a valid state policy could not be invalidated simply
because of an employee's religious beliefs. Specifically, Native
Americans could be fired from their jobs at a drug rehabilitation
organization for using a hallucinogen in the context of a religious
ceremony. 2°9 Scalia declared that the state need not articulate a
compelling interest to justify generally applicable religion-neutral laws
that have the effect of burdening religious practice. 2 10 Scalia argued
200. See id. at 234.
201. See id. at 250-51.
202. See id.; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(stating generally the need for a valid and neutral law)).
203. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 250-51 (suggesting that the Court would not make such
exceptions for either another religious group or a non-religious person with equally "heartfelt"
beliefs about holding her child out of school). Justice Stevens reiterated this point, stating in City
of Boerne v. Flores, "[a] governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion" is in conflict with the Establishment Clause. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing
that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was violative of the First Amendment) (citing
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-55 (1985)).
204. See, e.g., FARBER, supra note 55, at 251.
205. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990).
206. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 252.
207. See id.
208. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
209. See id. at 890.
210. See id. at 884.
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that the compelling state interest test provided exemptions for religious
beliefs that would be impermissible if analyzed under the Establishment
Clause because these types of policies constituted a state preference to
those with particular religious beliefs. 211 Notably, however, Scalia
distinguished Yoder by creating an exception for situations where Free
212
Exercise rights were accompanied by a second constitutional right.
Negative reaction to the Smith opinion was swift. 213 Congress reacted
by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 214 but the Court later
ruled that it was unconstitutional.2 15
Although the restrictive nature of the Smith decision severely reduced
claims of Free Exercise, the decision's breadth was not as dramatic as
one might expect. 2 16 In fact, the line of cases prohibiting state policies
that specifically discriminate against religious groups has remained
strong. 217 Attempts to apply the Free Exercise Clause to issues
traditionally considered under the Establishment Clause have been
largely unsuccessful. 218 In large part, this is because the state rarely
bars an individual's freedom of religious speech in its entirety. In fact,
none of the circuit court cases considering student-led graduation prayer
2 19
directly invoked the Free Exercise line of cases.
2. Introduction to Free Speech Bases
Unlike Free Exercise jurisprudence, the Free Speech doctrine has
been applied to school prayer issues. 220 This doctrine allows the
government to reasonably regulate the time, manner, and place of
speech. 22 1 The content of such speech, however, may only be restricted

211. See id. at 885.
212. See id. at 881 (noting that Yoder involved the fundamental, impliedly constitutional right
for parents to make decisions about their child's education).
213. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 254.
214. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994)
(declared unconstitutional in Cit, of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
215. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding RFRA unconstitutional
and stating that Congress cannot use disagreement with judiciary as a basis for new legislation).
216. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 257 (noting that although Smith is clearly the law, "reports
of the death of the Free Exercise Clause have been somewhat exaggerated").
217. See id. at 257-59; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993) (invalidating an ordinance restricting the use of animals in sacrificial
ceremonies).
218. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 257-58.
219. See infra Part III (outlining the current status of the law regarding student-led graduation
prayer).
220. See Allred, supra note 48, at 746-50.
221. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 15; see also Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1117 (3d Cir.
1992) (considering whether religious speech at a public high school graduation ceremony is a
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under particular circumstances, based on either the nature of the
government's involvement with the location of the speech or the
222
identity of the speaker.
a. Speech on Public Property: Public Forum Doctrine
The Court has outlined special limitations on speech that is delivered
on public property. 223 Not all properties, however, are treated equally;
instead, the allowance of a government restriction is based upon the
type of public property (called a forum) that is implicated.22 4 The Court
has recognized three types of fora: a traditional public forum, a
designated public forum and a non-public forum. 225 A traditional public
forum is a place that has traditionally hosted public assembly and
discourse. 226 Traditional public fora include areas such as sidewalks
and streets.2 27 The government may only restrict the content of speech
in a traditional public forum if it can articulate a compelling state
interest to do so. 228 In addition, the government
restriction must be
229
narrowly tailored to meet that state interest.
Designated fora are places that are not traditionally considered areas
for public debate and include university meeting facilities, school board
meetings, and municipal theaters. 230 These places are treated as
designated fora, however, because the government has specifically
opened the place to entertain limited public communication. 23 1 Speech
in a designated fora is afforded constitutional protections similar to
speech in traditional fora. 232 Like traditional fora, content-based
restrictions on speech are only allowed if restrictions are narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 233 The third type of forum,
violation of Free Speech and Establishment Clauses, and using public forum analysis to make this
determination).
222. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 15.
223. See id. at 167.
224. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985).
225. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)
(holding that a school's mail system was a non-public forum whose access could not be restricted
to one particular employee union over another).
226. See id. at 45.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id. (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 132 (1981)).
230. See id. at 46.
231. See id.; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
800 (1985).
232. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-47.
233. See id. at 66 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
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the non-public forum, includes government properties that are not
considered traditional or designated public fora. 234 Unlike traditional or
designated public fora, the government has "broad" control over speech
in a non-public forum. 235 The government may regulate speech without
of
a compelling interest. 236 The only limitation is that the regulation 237
purpose.
intended
forum's
the
of
light
in
reasonable
be
must
speech
Still, expression cannot be238suppressed merely because public officials
oppose the speaker's view.
Thus, once a forum has been opened by the state for public debate or
discourse, an attempt by the government to curtail particular forms of
speech may constitute impermissible viewpoint discrimination 239 unless
the government can demonstrate a compelling state interest. 240 If the
speech occurred in a non-public forum, the government may reasonably
regulate an individual's private speech as long as public officials do not
simply because they oppose the speaker's particular
curtail expression
24 1
viewpoint.
Traditionally, the Court has analyzed actions within schools and
universities under the designated public forum or non-public forum
standard.24 2 For example, a line of public forum cases considered the
access of religious student groups to school facilities. 243 In Widmar v.
Vincent,244 the Supreme Court held that a university that opened its
facilities for after-hours use by student groups created a designated
public forum. 245 Therefore, the Court concluded that the university
deliberately opened the facilities for use beyond their normal
instructional purpose. 246 The Court prohibited the university from
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980)).
234. See id. at 46.
235. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 173.
236. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 70 n. 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
237. See Swanson, supra note 182, at 1423 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45).
238. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-93
(1993) (stating that neutral accommodation must be exercised within non-public fora): Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985); Perry,460 U.S. at 46.
239. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 888 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
240. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
241. See id. at 46-49.
242. See Allred, supra note 48, at 746-50 (discussing forum analysis in schools).
243. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 172. These cases applied First Amendment limitations to
the states through the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 172-73.
244. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
245. See id. at 269; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 842 (1995).
246. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 (citing the "neutral" purpose of the policy).
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barring religious student groups from using the facilities because the
university did not convincingly articulate a compelling reason to do
SO. 24 7 Although the university invoked the Establishment Clause itself
as a compelling reason to limit use by students, the Court reasoned the
clause would not be violated.24 8 It concluded that the mere use of
public space by a religious group did not mean that there was an
2 49
impermissible "imprimatur of state approval" to the religious activity.
Rather, a policy allowing any student group to use university facilities
250
was neutral on its face and treated all student groups equally.
The Court, however, made a distinction between university and
secondary school students when it found no violation of the
Establishment Clause in Widmar 2 5 1 The Court stated that university
students are "less impressionable" than younger students and should be
able to appreciate that the university's policy is one of "neutrality
toward religion." 252 The majority opinion also implied that the
Establishment Clause might serve as a compelling enough reason to
regulate a public forum if violated in a secondary school.2 53 If younger
students would glean state-sponsorship from a policy's allowance of
religious presence in a secondary school, such a violation might be
found.25 4
2 55
In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,
the Court considered a university funding policy for student
publications.2 56 The university wished to restrict funding to a religious
student publication entitled Wide Awake. 257 The Court concluded that
247.

See id. at 277. Some have commented, however, that Widmar is a narrow decision. See

SMITH, supra note 51, at 223 (discussing Widmar and stating that "this might imply an increasing

willingness on the part of the Court to permit religious exercise in the public sector"). But see
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 282 (White, J., dissenting) ("I believe states to be a good deal freer to formulate policies that affect religion in divergent ways than does the majority.").
248. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267.
249. Id. at 274 ("[A]n open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of
state approval on religious sects or practices.").
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 274 n.14; see also SMITH, supra note 51, at 227 (stating that this distinction
will limit speech rights of secondary students).
253. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 275. Specifically, the Court held "[a]t least in the absence of
empirical evidence that religious groups will dominate UMKC's [University of Missouri at Kansas City] open forum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would
not be the forum's 'primary effect."' Id.
254. See id. at 274 n.14.
255. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
256. See id. at 823.
257. See id. at 826-28.
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the university could not regulate speech based on its content unless that
regulation facilitated the forum's intended purpose. 258 Otherwise, the
259
regulation constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
Because the intended purpose of the policy in Rosenberger was to fund
student publications, the Supreme Court determined that a denial of
such funding based solely on the basis of religious belief did not further
the intended purpose. 260 Similarly, in Board of Education of the
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,261 the Court held that a
secondary school could not deny a student Christian club access to
school facilities. 262 In Mergens, the Court extended the standard
articulated in Widmar and created no distinction between university and
263
secondary school settings.
b. Regulation of Speech Based on a Speaker's Identity: Student Speech
The government may also regulate speech based upon the speaker's
identity. 264 This is especially true in the case of custodial institutions
such as schools, prisons and military institutions. 265 The Supreme Court
has concluded that the government may restrict individual activity,
including speech, because the scope of state authority in these
organizations is substantial.2 66
The Supreme Court first considered the Free Speech rights of public
school secondary students in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District.267 In Tinker, a school policy specifically
prohibited students from wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam
War. 268 Justice Fortas declared that "[students do not] shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate." 269 Even still, the Court acknowledged that it should
consider Free Speech rights of students in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment. 270 Thus, it established a

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

See id. at 829-30 (reviewing the general rules of regulated speech in a specific forum).
See id.
See id. at 832-33.
Board ofEduc. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
See id. at 253.
See id. at 250.
See FARBER, supra note 55, at 187.
See id.
See id.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
See id. at 504.
Id. at 506.
See id.
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special standard for private student expression in public secondary
schools. 271 The Court held that if the expression by students did not
materially disrupt classwork or cause substantial chaos, it was
constitutionally permissible. 272 The Court found that the Des Moines
School District's policy was impermissible because the school
administration's action was an attempt to "avoid the discomfort and
273
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."
Despite this holding, the Court subsequently limited students' rights
of expression in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser274 and
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.275 The Court distinguished
the student speech in both cases from the facts of Tinker and, thus,
established different standards. In Fraser,the Court considered student
speech at a school assembly. 276 The speech was considered quasicurricular because of the level of teacher supervision and control.277 As
a result, the Court provided broad discretion to the school district to
censor sexually explicit student speech at the assembly that was
"inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school
education." 278 The Court noted that although similar speech might be
allowed in another setting, the value-based nature of a school setting
compelled a special discretion to school administration. 279 Thus, it
noted that the "First Amendment rights of students ... are not
280
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."
28 1
The Court expanded the breadth of that discretion in Kuhlmeier.
The Kuhlmeier Court allowed a school principal to censor stories about
teen pregnancy and parents' divorces from a student newspaper. 282 The
Court distinguished Tinker based upon the nature of the speech
involved. 2 83 It remarked that Tinker compelled a school to simply
tolerate private student expression. 284 In contrast to Tinker, the Court
271. See id. at 509.
272. See id.
273. Id.
274. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
275. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
276. See Fraser,478 U.S. at 685.
277. See id. at 683.
278. Id. at 685-86.
279. See id. at 685.
280. Id. at 682.
281. See generally FARBER, supra note 55, at 189 (discussing the allowance of broad discretion over quasi-curricular activities in Kuhlmeier).
282. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274 (1988).
283. See id. at 270-71.
284. See id.
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characterized the speech at issue in Kuhimeier as quasi-curricular
because it was supervised by teachers and could be perceived as bearing
the "imprimatur of the school. 28 5 The Court concluded that the school
district could reasonably limit such speech if it articulated "legitimate
pedagogical concerns" in prohibiting it.286 In addition, the Court
refused to characterize the student newspaper as a public forum that
deserved more freedom of expression. 287 The Court noted that the
intended purpose of the newspaper was curricular in nature and not
288
public expression because it involved journalism instruction.

III.

DISCUSSION

Supreme Court decisions involving First Amendment issues in a
school setting fluctuate in their focus between the Establishment and
Free Speech Clauses. 289 Lower court cases involving student-led
prayers at graduation ceremonies are no exception. 290 Although the
Supreme Court settled the constitutionality of graduation prayer
sponsored by school officials and delivered by clergy in Lee v.
Weisman, 29 1 federal circuit courts vacillate on the issue of studentinitiated school prayer.292 Without direction from the Supreme Court,
circuit courts are left with a choice of criteria in evaluating student-led
school prayer. 293 These courts have reached strikingly different
294
conclusions, even when using similar modes of analysis.

285. Id.at 271.
286. See id. at 273 (holding such a standard applied to "editorial control over the style and
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities"). Interestingly, Kuhimeier
stands for a large degree of discretion to educators, which seems counter to the limitations on
educators' decisions in the school-prayer graduation line of cases. See id. at 273 n.7
("[Elducators decisions with regard to the content of ...expressive activities are entitled to substantial deference."). But see id. at 286 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[This discretion] was referring only to the appropriateness of the mannerin which the message is conveyed, not of the message's content." (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986))).
287. See id. at 270.
288. See id.
289. See supra Part II.
290. See infra Parts III.A-B (discussing various circuit court holdings concerning First
Amendment issues in school settings).
291. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that clergy may not conduct a prayer
at a graduation ceremony).
292. See infra Parts III.A-B (discussing the differences in holdings on the issue of student-led
school prayer).
293. See infra Parts III.A-B (describing the various constitutional standards employed by
lower courts).
294. See infra Parts III.A-B (discussing each case addressing student-led school prayer and its
holding).
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Four circuit courts have considered the issue of student-led
graduation prayer. 295 Of those four, three circuits have conflicting
decisions within the circuit. 29 6 All told, on three occasions courts have
found school policies allowing student-initiated prayer at graduation to
be permissible,2 97 while in four instances, courts have held such policies
impermissible. 298 These cases vacillate between an Establishment
Clause and Free Speech form of analysis. 299 In addition, even through
3
they are faced with similar facts, they reach disparate conclusions. 00
A. Courts Holding that Student-Led Prayerat GraduationCeremonies
Is ConstitutionallyPermissible

1. Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District (Fifth Circuit)
(November, 1992)
The Fifth Circuit was one of the first courts to consider the
constitutionality of student-led graduation speech. 30 ' In Jones v. Clear
Creek Independent School District,30 2 the Clear Creek Independent
School District allowed students to deliver an invocation or benediction
in a non-sectarian and non-proselytizing manner. 30 3 The school's
34
principal advised and counseled the students on permissible content. 0
Before it engaged in a traditional Establishment Clause analysis, the
court remarked upon the role of religion and character development in
295. The Third, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have considered the issue. See infra Parts
IHI.A-B (discussing the holdings of each federal circuit court of appeals that has considered this
issue).
296. The Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have conflicting decisions. See infra Parts IH.AB (discussing the split in the circuits).
297. See infra Part III.A (discussing the circuits that have found student-led prayer constitutional).
298. See infra Part III.B (discussing the circuits that have found student-led prayer unconstitutional).
299. See infra Part III (discussing the various forms of analysis for student-led graduation
prayer); see generally Stockman, supra note 50 (discussing the "varying approaches" to the issue).
300. See infra Parts m.A-B, IV (discussing these cases and their conclusions).
301. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted,
505 U.S. 1215 (1992) (former judgment vacated and remanded for further review in light of Lee
v. Weisman), reh'g en banc 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), and cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993).
The Fifth Circuit distinguished this case in February 1999. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Doe, 168 F.3d 806, 821-23 (5thCir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 494 (1999); see also infra
Part IfI.B.2 (discussing Santa Fe and distinguishing factors from Clear Creek).
302. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
303. See id. at 967. Santa Fe distinguished itself from Clear Creek on this point. See Santa
Fe, 168 F.3d at 818.
304. See Clear Creek, 977 F.2d at 965.
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modem education. 30 5 Specifically, the court emphasized the importance
of religious dialogue in light of "parental failure" to properly develop
moral character in their children. 30 6 In addition, the court was
concerned that a vigilant attempt to limit religious exchange in school
lead children to adopt a hostile attitude toward
settings might
30 7
religion.
In this light, the court held that Clear Creek's school policy withstood
the three part Lemon test. 30 8 The court found that the policy did not
manifest a religious intent but rather a secular purpose to solemnize the
graduation ceremony. 30 9 It further determined that the policy would not
have an effect of religious promotion or endorsement because the
310
student speech could only be non-sectarian and non-proselytizing.
The court declined to address the third prong of the Lemon test,
excessive entanglement
with religion, and relied instead on the first two
3 11
prongs of the test.
The court also considered the Supreme Court's other Establishment
Clause tests. 3 12 Under Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, originally
313
set forth in Lynch v. Donnelly, the court found the policy permissible.
The court held that the policy did not rise to the level of religious
endorsement because it did not specifically require prayer; rather, it
simply accommodated such expression. 314 In addition, the court
analyzed the case in light of Justice Kennedy's coercion test. 315 The
court concluded that the policy would not result in a coercive
atmosphere because any potentially religious speech would only be
delivered by a peer student, 3 16 and, thus, the court distinguished the
facts of Lee v. Weisman.3 17 In Lee, the Supreme Court used Kennedy's
coercion test to conclude that a policy that allowed clergy members to

305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See id. at 965-66 (citing Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990)).
308. See id. at 967.
309. See id. at 966-67.
310. See id. at 971.
311. See id. at 967-68 (holding that the non-sectarian nature of the school policy keeps the
case "free of all involvement with religious institutions").
312. See id. at 968-72.
313. See id. at 968 (discussing Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984)).
314. See id.
315. See id. at 969.
316. Seeid. at970-71.
317. See id.; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598-99 (1992).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 31

deliver an invocation was constitutionally impermissible. 318 The Fifth
Circuit in Clear Creek concluded that the effect of a peer speaker was
inherently less coercive than speech delivered by an authority figure,
such as a member of the clergy.3 19 In addition, it concluded that high
school students are able to understand the difference between
320
independent student speech and state-endorsed religion.
2. Doe v. Madison School DistrictNo. 321 (Ninth Circuit) (May, 1998)
The Ninth Circuit also considered graduation school-prayer under the
traditional Establishment Clause analysis. In Doe v. Madison School
District No. 321,321 the court considered a school policy that allowed
administrators to choose four students, based upon their academic
standing, to deliver an "address, poem, reading, song, musical
322
presentation, prayer or any other pronouncement of their choosing."
The court found this policy constitutional.32 3
The court analyzed the policy using the three part test articulated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, which focuses on a policy's purpose, effect, and
entanglement with religious activity. 324 In terms of the first prong, the
325
court found that the policy had a secular purpose for two reasons.
First, the school used "neutral and secular criterion" in choosing the
student speaker. 326 In addition, the court noted that the policy
contemplated a number of genres of student speech, rather than
referring exclusively to religious speech.32 7 In other words, the policy
318. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 581-85.
319. See Clear Creek, 977 F.2d at 972.
320. See id. at 971-72.
321. Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998) (granting summary
judgment for the school district, reasoning that the Establishment Clause was not violated), vacated on proceduralgrounds, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999) (reh'g en banc). Although this decision was vacated en banc on procedural grounds in May, 1999, the opinion is still instructive as
to the treatment of the issue within the Ninth Circuit. See Madison, 177 F.3d at 799 (holding that
parents did not have standing and further that the challenge did not present a live controversy because the plaintiffs had since graduated).
322. Madison, 147 F.3d at 834.
323. See id. at 838.
324. See id. at 836-38; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see also supra Part
II.A.2 (discussing the Lemon test).
325. See Madison, 147 F.3d at 837.
326. Id. at 835. The court invoked Justice Souter's reliance upon that criterion in his concurring opinion in Lee to support its rationale: "If the State had chosen its graduation day speakers
according to wholly secular criteria, and if one of those speakers (not a state actor) had individually chosen to deliver religious message, it would have been harder to attribute an endorsement of
religion to the state." Id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630 n.8 (1992) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
327. See id. at 836-37.
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was simply neutral toward religion. 328 Under the second prong of the
Lemon test, the court found that the policy had no primary religious
effect because religious speech was only one of a number of topics from
which a student could independently choose. 329 Even if a student chose
to deliver religious speech, the school included a disclaimer in the
graduation program that clarified the independence of the student's
choice. 330 The court found that this disclaimer erased any perception of
state endorsement of religion. 33 1 Thus, the policy had no religious
effect.332 The court only briefly considered the third prong of the
Lemon test, dismissing the possibility that the policy would create
excessive entanglement with religion because the policy was "neutral"
to both religious and non-religious speech.33 3
The court also considered the coercion test utilized in Lee v. Weisman
334
and relied upon the same factual rationale used to interpret Lemon.
The court noted that the policy in Madison included the element of
student "autonomy" that the Lee court suggested would characterize a
335
constitutionally appropriate policy.
3. Chandler v. James (Eleventh Circuit) (July, 1999)
In July, 1999, a panel of judges from the Eleventh Circuit in
Chandler v. James336 held that a school policy permitting student-led
prayer was constitutionally permissible. 337 The policy allowed "nonsectarian, non-proselytizing student-initiated voluntary prayer,
invocations and/or benedictions during compulsory or non-compulsory

328. See id. at 837.
329. See id.
330. See id. at 836-37.
331. The disclaimer read, "any presentation by participants of graduation exercises is the private expression of the individual participants and does not reflect any official position of Madison
School District #321 ..." Id. at 837 n.5.
332. See id. at 838.
333. See id.
334. See id. at 835-36 (referring to Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587-90 (1992)).
335. See id. at 835. In reaching this conclusion, the Madison Court cited the Lee opinion,
where three of the five majority Justices commented: "If the State had chosen its Graduation day
speakers according to wholly secular criteria, and if one of those speakers (not a state actor) had
individually chosen to deliver a religious message, it would have been harder to attribute an endorsement of religion to the State." Lee, 505 U.S. at 630 n.8 (Souter, J., concurring).
336. Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999), petition for cert.filed, 68 U.S.L.W.
3391 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1999) (No. 99-935).
337. See id. The panel was comprised of Judges Tjoflat, Godbold, and Hill. Note that this
panel differs from the one in Adler v. Duval County School Board, 174 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir.
1999). The panel in Alder included Judges Hatchett, Marcus, and Kravitch. See id.; infra Part
1fI.B.4 (discussing Adler and its holding).
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school-related student assemblies, sporting events, school-related
graduation or commencement ceremonies and other school-related
338
student events."
The court concluded that the case did not implicate the Establishment
Clause because student speech could not constitute state or government
endorsement of religion. 339 Instead, the court considered student speech
to be private religious expression. 340 The court rejected the idea that
students speaking at a formal public school ceremony were acting on
behalf of the school simply because they were present on school
grounds. 34 1 The Eleventh Circuit panel distinguished the controlling
Supreme Court case on graduation school prayer, Lee v. Weisman, on
those grounds. 342 Lee used traditional Establishment Clause analysis to
conclude that graduation prayer by clergy constituted state endorsement
of religion.

34 3

The Chandler court instead based its decision on Free Speech
grounds. 344 The court first recognized the graduation ceremony as a
non-public forum. 345 Thus, limitations on student religious speech
could only reach the time, place, and manner restrictions that would
govern secular speech.3 46 The court also concluded that the school
could not restrict the content of student speech at graduation
ceremonies, including religious speech. The court did note that a Free
Speech analysis would not always be appropriate and found two
situations where the more traditional Establishment Clause analysis
should be invoked.34 7 The court suggested that private student speech
would be transformed into a state-endorsed action if a school policy

338. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.3(b) (1995).
339. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1261-62.
340. See id. at 1261.
341. See id. at 1261-62.
342. See id. at 1258.
343. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597-99 (1992).
344. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1260-63. The court said, "student-initiated religious speech is
private speech endorsing religion, it is fully protected by both the Free Exercise and the Free
Speech Clauses of the Constitution." Id. at 1261 (citing Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226, 250 (1990)); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969) ("[S]tudents [do not] ... shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate.");
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 964-65 (5th Cir. 1992) (rehearingen banc)
(holding a school policy of permitting public high school student volunteers to deliver nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocations at graduation ceremonies constitutional).
345. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1264-65.
346. See id. "This includes restrictions on announcements permitted in the schools' commencement programs and the distribution of religious literature." Id. at 1266 n.20.
347. See id. at 1264.
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required administrative oversight of that speech.348 Because such a
policy might constitute state endorsement of religion, the Establishment
Clause would be implicated. 34 9 The court further warned that overly
350
proselytizing student speech might create a coercive atmosphere.
Accordingly, the coercion test endorsed by Justice Kennedy for
Establishment Clause analysis might be violated. 35 1 Besides these two
examples, the court offered no other guidelines concerning graduation
352
prayer.
B. Courts Holding That Student-Led Prayerat GraduationCeremonies
Is ConstitutionallyImpermissible
1. Harrisv. Joint School DistrictNo. 241 (Ninth Circuit) (November,
1994)
The Ninth Circuit held in Harris v. Joint School District No. 241353
that a student-selected prayer was unconstitutional.35 4 Although the
opinion was vacated as moot by the Supreme Court in June of 1995 on
procedural grounds, 355 other circuits have since relied upon it as
persuasive. 356 Additionally, in Doe v. Madison School DistrictNo. 321,
the Ninth Circuit distinguished Harris and came to a different
357
holding.
Harris involved a school policy allowing a majority vote by students
to select religious prayer at their graduation ceremonies. Student

348. See id. The court stated that active endorsement, encouragement or participation constitutes prohibited "active supervision." See id. at 1264-65 n.19. Supervision does not mean mere
presence. See id.
349. See id. at 1265.
350. See id.
351. See id. (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)).
352. See id.
353. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated as moot, 515 U.S.
1154 (1995). It is notable that a subsequent court discussing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Harris stated that the case's mootness was a result of the graduation of the student-plaintiffs. See
Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1117 (D. Idaho 1997).
354. See Harris,41 F.3d at 458. The Ninth Circuit had earlier found that prayer was unconstitutional under the auspices of a school assembly. See Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist.,
644 F.2d 759, 760 (9th Cir. 1981).
355. See Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 515 U.S. 1154, 1154 (1995), vacating as moot 41
F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994).
356. See, e.g., ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1483 (3d Cir.
1996) (citing Harris for its categorization of a graduation ceremony as a public forum).
357. See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
graduation prayer was permissible), vacated on procedural grounds, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir.
1999).
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speakers were selected based upon academic achievement. 358 The
school published a disclaimer in its graduation program, disavowing
359
any sponsorship or association with the content of student speech.
The Harriscourt used Justice Kennedy's coercion test to prohibit this
student speech. 360 The court found that the atmosphere was coercive
because the school inherently controlled in many ways (including
financially 36 1) such a formal event. 362 The court declared that the
school district could not disclaim responsibility for a decision so
important to students. 36 3 The court found that the potential for coercion
was natural because students were "obligated" to participate in all
364
portions of the ceremony, including any prayer.
The court also briefly moved beyond the coercion test in its
analysis. 365 First, the court considered Lemon and stated that there was
no secular purpose for allowing such speech. 366 It further declared that,
even if such a purpose could be shown, the primary effect of such
speech would be to endorse religion, thereby failing the second prong of
Lemon. 367 Second, the court flatly rejected the school's Free Speech
argument and declared that the graduation ceremony was not a public
368
forum.
2. Santa Fe Independent School Districtv. Doe (Fifth Circuit)
(February, 1999)
In February, 1999, the Fifth Circuit distinguished its decision in
Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District when finding
graduation prayer to be impermissible in Doe v. Santa Fe Independent
School District.369 In Santa Fe, students and parents filed suit against
the school district over school policies that governed speech at
graduation ceremonies and sporting events. 370 Under the first policy,
358. See Harris,41 F.3d at 453.
359. See id.
360. See id.at 457.
361. Seeid. at 454.
362. See id.
363. See id. at 454-55.
364. See id. at 457.
365. See id.
366. See id. at 457-58 (citing Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 762 (9th
Cir. 1981)).
367. See id. at 458.
368. See id.
369. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct.
494 (1999).
370. See id. at 811. Such speech was quite traditional. See Duggan, supra note 3, at A3 (dis-
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the school selected students to deliver an invocation or benediction at
the graduation ceremony. 37 1 School administrators screened the
language of the speeches and censored prayers that were too
proselytizing. 372 The policy prohibited religious speech by clergy and
school officials in response to Lee v. Weisman, which held such
practices unconstitutional.3 7 3
Unlike the graduation context, the Santa Fe Independent School
District did not have an explicit policy for religious student speech at
athletic games until the litigation commenced.37 4 Once developed, the
football policy allowed student prayer before games. 375 In part, the
school district's policy followed the rationale of the leading Fifth
Circuit case on the issue at the time, Clear Creek.3 76 Similar to the
court's analysis in Clear Creek, the school district justified pre-game
prayer because it "solemnize[d] the event,... promote[d] good
sportsmanship and student safety, and . . . establish[ed] the appropriate
environment for the competition." 377 Although the school district
argued that it would strike any proselytizing speech from graduation or
athletic events, neither policy required that prayers be non-proselytizing
and non-sectarian. 378 Instead, the school district deferred that decision
379
until such time as they were ordered by the court to do so.
In approaching the constitutionality of the school district's policy, the
court first distinguished two points of its earlier holding in Clear
Creek.380 First, the court reasoned that the Santa Fe Independent School
District had allowed prayers to be proselytizing and sectarian and, thus,
overstepped the protections of the Clear Creek decision. 38 1 Secondly,
cussing the history of football in Texas and its role in the community); see also Catalina Camia,
Congress Should Join Pushfor Pre-Game Prayer,DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 24, 1999, at
12A (quoting Texas Congressman Joe Barton, "The pre-game prayer is as much an institution as
Texas football itself.").
371. See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 812.
372. See id. at 810.
373. See id. at 811.
374. See id. at 810.
375. See id. at 812.
376. See id. (stating that the football game prayer policy was essentially the same as the final
graduation prayer policy which had been held constitutional in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent
School District, 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the holding
in Clear Creek, which allowed students to deliver invocation or benediction in a non-sectarian
and non-proselytizing manner).
377. Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 812.
378. See id.
379. See id.
380. See id. at 814-15.
381. See id. at 816.
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the court refused to extend the Clear Creek prayer policy to include
football games because there was no need for solemnization in that
382
setting.
Following Clear Creek's lead, the court analyzed both policies
according to the three part Lemon test. 383 The court held that the secular
purpose of solemnization relied upon in Clear Creek to allow studentled prayer was not present in Santa Fe.3 84 The court found that the
school district had a clear religious purpose and pointed to the district's
reluctance to prohibit sectarian or proselytizing prayer unless mandated
by court order. 385 The court noted that any type of proselytizing student
speech "transform[ed] the character of the ceremony." 386 The court
concluded that the policy also violated the second part of the Lemon
test. 387 The court found that the primary effect of a policy that
requested students to lead an invocation or benediction would be to
advance religion and would, therefore, constitute religious endorsement
by the state.3 88 The court put little emphasis on the fact that the prayer
was student-initiated and student-led.3 89 Instead, the court relied upon
its reasoning with respect to the first two prongs of the test to conclude
that the prayer also violated the third prong. As a result, the court
ruled
390
that the policy excessively entangled government with religion.
The court also considered Justice Kennedy's coercion test as outlined
in Lee v. Weisman. 391 Ultimately, however, the court rested upon the
fact that the policy failed to meet the proscriptions in the Lemon test,
thereby declining to engage in the Lee analysis. 392 In addition, the court
acknowledged Justice O'Connor's endorsement test 393 and stated that,
by permitting religious speech at a graduation ceremony or athletic

382. See id. at 823; see also Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 168 (5th Cir.
1993) (holding that an injunction prohibiting prayer at basketball games and/or practices was
likely to succeed on its merits).
383. See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 814.
384. See id. at 816.
385. See id. (referring to the decision to change the speech policy only if mandated by court
order); see also supra Part I.A.1 (discussing Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District).
386. Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 816.
387. See id. at 817.
388. See id. at 817-18.
389. See id.
390. See id.
391. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
392. See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 818 (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 588-90).
393. See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (involving governmental endorsement of
religion by means of challenged action).

The Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity

2000]

event, the school implied the district's sponsorship and endorsement of
religion.

394

Unlike other circuit courts, the dissenting opinion acknowledged the
Santa Fe School District's argument that student-led graduation prayer
395
should be analyzed under Free Exercise and Free Speech doctrines.
Specifically, the school district argued that a graduation ceremony was a
designated public forum. 396 For that reason, it contended that any
limitation on speech would "constitute impermissible viewpoint
discrimination." 397 Although the majority in Santa Fe declared that
religious speech at the graduation ceremony did not warrant Free
Speech analysis, the dissenting judge disagreed and remarked that the
majority should have exercised a more thorough Free Speech
analysis. 398 The dissent suggested that a graduation ceremony could be
classified as a public forum because it met the definition of a
399
government sponsored event where private views were expressed.
The dissent concluded that if the government prohibited proselytizing
religious speech in a public forum, but tolerated ecumenical religious
speech, the government had engaged in illegitimate, viewpoint
discrimination.a°00

3. ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education (Third
Circuit) (May, 1996)
Unlike the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the Third Circuit has heard
only one case on the issue of student-led graduation prayer. The case,
ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education,4 1 involved a
Board of Education policy that allowed students to vote on whether to
allow prayer at graduation ceremonies. 40 2 Prior to this policy, the Board
implemented a policy that allowed clergy members to perform
benedictions and invocations at graduation ceremonies. 40 3 In an effort
to conform to the requirements of Lee v. Weisman, however, the Board
developed a new policy that clearly prohibited any endorsement,

394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 818.
See id. at 825 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
See id. at 814.
Id.
See id. at 825 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
See id. (Jolly, J., dissenting).
See id. (Jolly, J., dissenting).
ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996).
See id. at 1474-75.
See id. at 1475.
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organization or promotion of religious speech by school personnel.4 °4
Further, the Board hoped that the presence of a student vote would be in
line with the permissible parameters set forth in the Fifth Circuit's
40 5
decision of Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District.
The Third Circuit disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's decision to allow
such prayer in Clear Creek and accordingly deemed Black Horse's
policy invalid. 4°6 The court relied on the Lemon and Lee tests to
invalidate the policy. 4 0 7 Under the first prong of the Lemon test, the
school argued that its purpose was secular because it sought to promote
free speech.4 °8 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that a
graduation ceremony was not a public forum and, thus, did not require
free speech protections. 4°9 In addition, the court rejected the school
district's argument that prayer assisted in the solemnization of the
ceremony. 4 10 The court determined that a graduation ceremony would
be a solemn occasion with or without prayer. 4 11 The court concluded
that the school district endorsed religious speech when it created the
4 12
revised policy.
Under the second prong of Lemon, the court found that the allowance
of prayer at graduation ceremonies would naturally have the effect of
promoting or endorsing religious activity. Therefore, the policy failed
the second part of the Lemon test. 4 13 The court rejected the school's
argument that the freedom afforded to student speakers would prevent
4 14
the promotion of a specific religious message from year to year.
Rather, the court held that any religious message would have a religious
effect.4 15 The court further discounted the fact that the school inserted a
disclaimer on programs to separate itself from the speech and held that
no matter what distance the school might intimate, the policy would

404. See id. at 1474 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)).
405. See id. at 1474-75.
406. See id. at 1482.
407. See id. at 1482-88.
408. See id. at 1484.
409. See id.
410. See id. at 1485.
411. See id. But see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding that prayer before
legislative sessions has a solemnizing effect). The Black Horse court distinguished Marsh because of the differing contexts in which prayer would be taking place. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d
at 1485.
412. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1485.
413. See id. at 1487.
414. See id.
415. See id.
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imply state endorsement of religion. 4 16 The court failed to address the
entanglement prong of the Lemon test, relying solely upon the first two
prongs.417
The court also considered other Establishment Clause tests. 4 18 For
example, it contemplated the coercion test set forth in Lee v.
Weisman.419 The court held that a democratic vote by students on the
graduation speech was not enough to avoid the risk of a coercive
atmosphere. 420 It held that "an impermissible practice cannot be
transformed into a constitutionally acceptable one by putting a
democratic process to an improper use." 421 In so holding, the court
noted that the inherent control of the school graduation ceremonies
as the students
would put great pressure on students to participate, 422det
prayer at the graduation ceremony would be
who voted not to have 423
forced to hear it anyway.
The school district made a Free Speech argument similar to that made
by the Santa Fe district, but the court likewise rejected it. 424 The court
concluded that graduation ceremonies were not public forums and,
therefore, were not entitled to Free Speech protection. 4 25 The court's
dissent, however, gave more credence to the school district's Free
Speech argument. 426 The dissent concluded that the speech was
student-directed, was free of excessive school involvement, and had a
purpose more in tune with solemnization. 427 In addition, the court's
dissent found that the policy was not violative of the Lemon test because
school disclaimer
the student polling was secular in nature 428 and a 429
avoided the potential image of state power or coercion.

416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
neither.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.

See id.
See id. at 1488.
See id. at 1478.
See id. at 1478-83.
See id. at 1479.
Id. at 1477.
See id. at 1479-80.
See id. at 1480. The vote was 128 for prayer, 120 for a moment of silence, and 20 for
See id. at 1475.
See id. at 1478.
See id.
See id. at 1490 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1490-91 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1495 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1496 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
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4. Adler v. Duval County School Board (Eleventh Circuit) (May, 1999)
In May, 1999, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed in Adler v. Duval
County School Board430 a school district policy that allowed a student
majority vote to determine whether there would be unrestricted studentled speech at the beginning or closing of graduation ceremonies. 43 1 The
school district had traditionally included a clergy-led prayer in
graduation ceremonies. 432 When the Supreme Court prohibited that
practice in Lee v. Weisman, however, the school district was forced to
adjust its policy. 4 33 In response, the school district only allowed the
possibility of student-directed speech.43 4 Yet the court, in Adler
determined that the school district did not make a bona fide attempt to
comport to newly established constitutional standards even though the
district looked to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Jones v. Clear Creek
435
Independent School Districtfor guidance when modifying its policy.
The court used the rationale of both the Lemon and Lee tests to
conclude that student-led graduation prayer was impermissible. 436 The
policy first failed the Lemon test.437 The court held that the policy had
a clear religious purpose because the school district's intent was to
formulate a new policy that would maintain the religious speech that
438
had been a traditional part of the district's graduation ceremonies.
Additionally, the court held that the policy violated the second part of
the Lemon test because its primary effect was to permit prayer at
graduation. 439 The court failed to address the third prong of the Lemon
test, excessive entanglement with religion, because the policy clearly
44
violated the first two prongs. 0
The court also analyzed the policy in light of Justice Kennedy's
coercion test, which was cited in Lee v. Weisman.44 1 It cited several
reasons why the policy created a coercive atmosphere. 44 2 First, the
430. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (Hatchett, Marcus and
Kravitch, J.J.), vacated, reh 'g en banc granted, Jun. 3, 1999.
431. See id.
432. See id. at 1238.
433. See id. (citing generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)).
434. See id. at 1239-40.
435. See id. at 1239 (citing generally Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th
Cir. 1992)).
436. See id. at 1251.
437. See id.
438. See id. at 1249.
439. See id. at 1251.
440. See id.
441.
442.

See id. at 1243.
See id. at 1244.
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court rejected the idea that the school administration could separate
itself from religious speech because the speech was delivered by a
student. 44 3 Instead, it concluded that the inherent control school
administrators held over the graduation ceremony rendered them
responsible for all of its content.'" In fact, the court noted that the mere
opportunity for student speech in a graduation ceremony was ultimately
the prerogative of the school district. 445 When students spoke at the
public school graduation ceremony, they in effect became actors of the
446
state.
The court found that, although students voted on the presence of
religious speech in their ceremony, this did not "erase the imprint of the
state from graduation prayer." 447 The court posited that a majority vote
of one's peers endorsing religious speech would create a far more
coercive and dominating atmosphere than if the choice was left to
school administrators. 448 The court noted that students would feel
coerced to listen and respond to the religious speech because their
449
attendance at their graduation ceremonies was so important to them.
Students who disagreed with the vote to include religious prayer would
have no choice but to participate in the ceremony. 450 As a result, the
court found that reasonable students would not be able to distinguish
"student-elected sectarian and proselytizing prayerful messages" from
4 51
state sponsorship and "will feel coerced to participate in them."
IV.

ANALYSIS

As shown, courts and commentators disagree on the appropriate
45 2
standard of analysis to apply to student-led graduation prayer.

443. See id.
444. See id.
445. See id. (citing ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'I Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1479 (3d
Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
446. See id. at 1246 (stating that "[w]hen the senior class is given plenary power over a state
sponsored, state controlled event such as a high school graduation, it is just as constrained by the
Constitution as the state would be." (quoting Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 455
(9th Cir. 1994))).
447. Id. at 1244.
448. See id. at 1247 (making a determination in direct opposition to Clear Creek). In effect, it
seems as if the court will not acknowledge any independent decision-making ability of the students, instead attributing the decisions of the students to the state. See id.
449. See id. at 1248.
450. See id.
451. Id. at 1247.
452. See supra Part III (discussing the disagreement among courts regarding whether studentled prayer at graduation ceremonies is constitutionally protected).
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Traditionally, these types of school prayer cases were subject to an
Establishment Clause analysis. 453 The thrust of the Establishment
Clause is the prohibition of government policies that endorse or support
religious practice. 4 54 Thus, under the Establishment Clause, courts
evaluate school prayer policies to determine whether they produce such
a result. 455 Accordingly, the Establishment Clause analysis focuses
456
primarily on schools and their motivations for implementing policies.
As a result, the rights of students to express their religious beliefs are
often disregarded.45 7 A growing number of cases and commentators,
including Justices O'Connor and Scalia, have suggested that a Free
Speech form of analysis should be considered in addition to an
Establishment Clause analysis. 458
This approach considers two
additional issues: the special Free Speech standards for student
speakers459 and the regulation of speech on public property. 46 0 Because
the issue incorporates both the prohibition of government entanglement
with school prayer and the protection of student expression of religious
beliefs, the optimal approach is one that looks at graduation prayer
under the dual lenses of the Establishment and Free Speech Clauses.
Graduation prayer, however, is unconstitutional under both analyses.
A. Establishment Clause Analysis Is Appropriate
The Establishment Clause restricts government policies that support
or endorse religious expression. 46 1 Thus, it seems appropriate to
453. See supra Part II (discussing the progression of the Court's application of the Establishment Clause).
454. See generally Allred, supra note 48, at 762-78 (discussing the Establishment Clause and
student religious speech in classrooms).
455. See, e.g., Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 964-65 (5th Cir. 1992)
(stating that the Establishment Clause analysis must consider whether the effect of the school
board policy is to "advance or endorse religion").
456. See id.
457. See id. at 965-66.
458. Justice O'Connor declared that student-initiated speech is "private speech endorsing religion, and is fully protected by both the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses." Board of Educ.
v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990). Justice Scalia suggested that a private speaker's ability to
conduct religious speech in a public forum is not considered an Establishment Clause violation.
See Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 769 (1995). He found that religious expression does not violate the Establishment Clause if it is not made by an employee of
the state and occurs in a traditional or designated public forum. See id. at 770; see also Allred,
supra note 48 (discussing student religious speech).
459. See supra Part II.B.2.b (discussing the Court's establishment of special standards for student expression in public schools).
460. See supra Part II.B.2.a (explaining the Court's outline of special limitations on speech
that is delivered on public property).
461. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 281.
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evaluate policies involving religion that are promulgated by a public
school system according to the provisions of the Establishment
Clause. 462 Policies that regulate public high school graduation
ceremonies, in effect, govern a state-sponsored event.4 63 Graduation
ceremonies are financially and organizationally supported by a school's
administration. 464 The Supreme Court has consistently held that
religious speech within a public school setting invokes an Establishment
Clause analysis, 465 and the majority of circuit courts considering
student-led graduation prayer have agreed. 46
These courts have
disagreed, however, on how the Establishment Clause is implicated by
these policies. 467 Courts can choose from three Establishment Clause
analyses: adopt pre-Lemon standards of analysis, 468 utilize the Lemon
47
test 469 or consider post-Lemon analyses. 0
1. Pre-Lemon: Graduation Policies Are Neither Separate Nor
Accommodating of Religion
The earliest Establishment Clause cases attempted to balance two
central philosophies: separation and accommodation. 47 1 Cases such as
Engel v. Vitale, which prohibited prayer in public schools, adopted the
stance that the Establishment Clause invalidated any policy that allowed
462. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding that an Alabama statute that
authorizes a period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer" violates the Establishment
Clause); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (stating that the Establishment Clause
does not require a university to close its facilities to registered religious groups where the facilities are generally available for activities of registered student groups); Jones v. Clear Creek Indep.
Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a school district resolution allowing
student volunteers, with the permission of the senior class, to present nonsectarian, non proselytizing graduation prayers does not violate the Establishment Clause).
463. See, e.g., Clear Creek, 977 F.2d at 965-66 (noting that the school district resolution at
issue was subject to Establishment Clause analysis because the State was providing space in a
closed forum for a government sponsored event).
464. See Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated as moot,
62 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 1995).
465. See supra Part I.A (outlining the history of the Establishment Clause and the Court's
application of the Clause to issues that involve religious speech).
466. See supra Part III (discussing conflicting decisions among circuit courts on the issue of
student-led prayer at graduation ceremonies).
467. See supra Part III (discussing the various holdings on the issue of student-led graduation
prayer).
468. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the judicial approach in the earliest Establishment
Clause cases).
469. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the three parts of the Lemon test and its application to
graduation school prayer cases).
470. See infra Part IV.A.3 (applying post-Lemon approaches to graduation prayer).
471. See supra Part II.A. I (discussing Establishment Clause jurisprudence in light of religious
expression in schools).
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religious speech in a public school. 472 For the most part, the Court has
sustained that idea.47 3 There have only been two types of exceptions to
this strict separationist view. 474 In Everson v. Board of Education, the
Court upheld a bus transportation policy because it did not explicitly
support religion but remained neutral to all students. 475 In addition, in
Zorach v. Clauson, the Court held that a policy that allowed students to
leave public school for religious instruction was 476simply an
accommodation of religious expression, not supportive of it.
Neither Everson nor Zorach involved student-led graduation prayer.
If student-led graduation prayer policies were analyzed in a strict
separationist vein, they would most likely be unconstitutional. Policies
either allowing students to vote for religious speech or directing school
administration to review such student speech create a knowing and
intentional religious presence in a public school.47 7 Only two factual
situations would seem to lessen this knowing presence. The first
involves policies that permit speech on a subject of a student's
choosing. These policies may receive protection because of their
neutrality. 4 78 Like the bus policy in Everson, such a policy treats all of
its recipients equally, but the constitutionality of such a policy would
most likely be marred if a school administrator ever reviewed the
student speech. 4 79 This review would ensure an awareness of religious
speech on the part of the school administration. 480 The knowing

472. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that the practice of the recitation of a
prayer in each class at the start of the school day was in violation of the Establishment Clause).
473. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 275 (noting that the prohibition of directed school prayer
is a "benchmark" of the Court's rulings in this area).
474. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308-9 (1952) (stating that so long as there is
"neither religious instruction in the public school classrooms nor the expenditure of public
funds," public schools are permitted to accommodate outside religious groups); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (stating that the First Amendment "requires the state to be neutral
in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to
be their adversary").
475. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 17 (holding that a state's bus transportation policy could support families with children attending religious schools).
476. See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 315.
477. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999). But see Jones v. Clear
Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 969-70 (5th Cir. 1992).
478. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18; see also Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832,
836-37 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated on procedural grounds, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999); Clear
Creek, 977 F.2d at 969. But see ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471,
1487 (3d Cir. 1996).
479. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1484.
480. See id.
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permission of such speech may be seen as endorsement or support of
religious speech.4 81
Another opportunity for permissible prayer might occur through the
accommodation line of cases.48 2 Under the accommodation cases, an
activity such as a moment of silence at a graduation ceremony might be
permitted. 483 With a moment of silence instead of student-led religious
speech, the school would only be accommodating religious expression,
but not endorsing or supporting it publicly. 484 Although moments of
silence have not received universal support from the Court, 4 85 Justice
Stevens in Wallace v. Jaffree suggested that a moment of silence policy
permissible as
that was neutral in motivation might be constitutionally
486
expression.
personal
of
an accommodation
Outside of the above exceptions, the presence of religious speech
within a public school graduation ceremony would be a violation of the
Establishment Clause under a separationist analysis. Permutations of
school policies that would render them permissible under this view
would undoubtedly require concessions that would destroy the intent of
students and/or school administrators to allow purely religious speech in
graduation ceremonies.
2. Graduation Prayer Violates the Lemon Test
If a court moved away from the separationist versus accommodation
framework and adopted the Lemon test, the results would remain the
same. Although the Lemon test has been utilized in the majority of
graduation-prayer cases, 487 its vagueness has resulted in uneven
application.4 8 8 The first part of the Lemon test requires an analysis of

481. See id.
482. See supra Part II.B.I (discussing the Free Exercise Clause, which prohibits government
policies restricting religious expression).
483. This was the type of compromise used by Nick Becker's school. See Layton, supra note
8, at CI.
484. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (exemplifying an accomodationist policy).
485. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
486. See id.
487. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)); Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d
806 (5th Cit. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 494 (1999); Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147
F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated on procedural grounds, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999);
ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist, 84 F.3d 1471, 1483 (3d Cir. 1996);
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 966 (5th Cir. 1992); see also supra Part III
(discussing the preceding cases in light of Lemon).
488. See supra Part H.A.2 (discussing the development and implementation of Lemon).
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the purpose of a graduation speech policy. 489 Policies that explicitly
endorse or request student-led prayer fail this part of the test because
their purpose is non-secular. 490 This includes policies that either allow a
49 1
student vote or tacitly request prayer.
Some school districts and courts, however, have articulated different
purposes.4 92 For example, the Fifth Circuit in Jones v. Clear Creek
Independent School District found the solemnization of a graduation
ceremony a secular purpose for student-initiated school prayer.4 93 Other
districts have held the purpose of such policies to be secular because
494
students were chosen by a secular criteria, such as academic standing.
This reasoning seems to be a pretext and is the type of disingenuous
action that the Lemon Court sought to avoid.49 5 The criteria for
choosing a student speaker would not supercede an intentional nonsecular purpose. 4 96 The only policy that could potentially survive the
first part of the Lemon test is one that genuinely invited general student
speech but did not specifically mention or exclusively contemplate
religious expression. 497 Ultimately, however, it is the subjective intent
of the drafters of such policies that would guide this analysis on a case498
by-case basis.
The second part of the Lemon test contemplates the effect of a
student-led graduation policy. 499 Specifically, a policy is impermissible
if it has an effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 5°° Some
commentators have argued that a graduation prayer policy should pass

489. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
490. See id.
491. See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 823 (noting that a football game is not a solemn event and,
thus, prayer is prohibited); Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1488 (holding that a school policy allowing
students to vote to include prayer at graduation violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment).
492. See Madison, 147 F.3d at 837 (citing the secular criterion used to choose student speakers); Clear Creek, 977 F.2d at 966-67 (citing a purpose to solemnize the ceremony). But see
Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 823 (rejecting the solemnization argument for football games); Black
Horse, 84 F.3d at 1485 (rejecting the solemnization argument).
493. See Clear Creek, 977 F.2d at 971.
494. See Madison, 147 F.3d at 835.
495. See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 816. The court held that prayer would rather "transform" the
event. See id.; see also Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1484-85 (noting that a student vote to include
prayer at graduation, even if serving a secular purpose, is still unconstitutional).
496. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11 th Cir. 1999).
497. See id.
498. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
499. See id. at 612.
500. See id.
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this part of the test. 50 1 In particular, they contend that, although a
regular practice of school prayer would have such an effect because of
its recurring nature, 50 2 speech at a graduation ceremony is a fairly
isolated occurrence that might seem more like a mere accommodation
than an endorsement of religious expression. Courts, however, have
50 3
rejected this argument.
Another circumstance that may pass muster under the second part of
Lemon is a policy that prohibits proselytizing or overly sectarian speech
that would curb any effect of advancing religion. 50 4 Two circuits have
found that a school policy has no religious effect under these
restrictions. 50 5 In addition, school policies where students were given a
wide range of acceptable speech to choose from would have little
religious effect. 5° Such a neutral policy could not be characterized as
advancing religion per se. 50 7 A simple disclaimer on a graduation
program has enabled some courts to minimize a policy's religious
effect. 50 8
Other courts, however, have simply disregarded such a
59
statement. 0
The third part of the Lemon test 5 10 was largely ignored by most
courts. Instead, courts either combined this excessive entanglement
prong of the test into the second prong or declined to consider it. 511 A
prayer policy requiring extensive supervision or review of a graduation
prayer policy by school administration would fail this portion of the
Lemon test because it would involve the "entanglement" that the Lemon

501. See generally Stockman, supra note 50, at 1820-22 (theorizing that graduation prayer
included at the sole choice of students may be constitutional under Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992)).
502. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (holding that school sponsored prayer is
unconstitutional).
503. See ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1488 (3d Cir. 1996).
504. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 967 (5th Cir. 1992).
505. See id. at 967; Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 1998),
vacated on procedural grounds, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999).
506. See Madison, 147 F.3d at 837.
507. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (exemplifying a neutral policy).
508. See Madison, 147 F.3d at 835 n.5.
509. See ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1487 (3d Cir. 1996).
510. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
511. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236, 1251 (11 th Cir. 1999) (declining to
consider entanglement because the policy failed the first two prongs); Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 818 (5th Cir. 1999) (analyzing government control as part of the effect test),
cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 494 (1999); Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1488 (declining to consider entanglement because the policy failed the first two prongs).
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Court sought to avoid.5 12 A policy ensuring complete autonomy to a
5 13
student speaker, however, would satisfy the test.
3. Post-Lemon: Graduation Prayer Policies Create Coercion and
Endorsement of Religious Speech
The alternative Establishment Clause tests suggested by members of
the Supreme Court would also deem impermissible a graduation prayer
policy. A policy that requires school administrators to be aware of
religious speech before its delivery would likely violate Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test. 5 14
Any pre-approval by school
administration of speech can reasonably be seen as an endorsement of
its content.5 15 Although Clear Creek held that permitting prayer is not
endorsement,5 16 the Santa Fe court disagreed, declaring that permitting
5 17
prayer is endorsement by mere implication.
Justice Kennedy's coercion test is more difficult to apply. 5 18 The
Court in Lee v. Weisman held that prayer delivered by an authority
5 19
figure such as a member of the clergy would be naturally coercive.
In addition, the Court cited the school's selection of the speaker as
bearing the imprimatur of the state. 52 ° Likewise, students who assume
the podium at a school-sponsored and controlled graduation ceremony
should be considered state actors whose speech is subject to
constitutional restrictions under the Establishment Clause. 521 Students
are subject to state control when a school's administration chooses one
of them to speak, allocates time for their speeches and provides advice
and guidance. 522 Further, to an adolescent, peer speech may be more
persuasive and coercive than to adults. 523 For example, a democratic
512. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999).
513. See Madison, 147 F.3d at 838 (the neutrality of the policy's accepted speech eschewed
any entanglement).
514. See Allred, supra note 48, at 774.
515. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1264.
516. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963,969 (5th Cir. 1992).
517. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 818 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
120 S. Ct. 494 (1999).
518. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing alternatives to the Lemon test, including Justice Kennedy's coercion test).
519. See Lee v. Weisman, 405 U.S. 577, 593 (1992).
520. See id.
521. But see Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding that students
are not state actors).
522. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 1999); ACLU v.
Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 (3d Cir. 1996); Harris v. Joint Sch.
Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated as moot, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995).
523. See Adler, 174 F.3d at 1248. But see Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d
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vote by students on whether to include prayer in ceremonies might
demonstrate to an agnostic student that the majority of his peers feel
that he should embrace religious speech.524 Such a student vote does
not "erase the imprint" of state control.52 5 The freedom of students to
choose their own type of speech does not change the fact that once
religious speech is presented to students, it might have a coercive
effect. 526 Non-prayer policies that survived Justice Kennedy's coercion
test involved religious expression that could easily be physically
avoided. Although a state employee might be able to walk by a
creche 527 or a cross, 528 a student cannot simply tune out religious speech
that is thrust upon him at a graduation ceremony he feels compelled to
attend.
B. GraduationPrayerPolicies Are Not Protectedby the
Free Speech Clause
Student-led graduation school prayer would also be unconstitutional
under a Free Speech analysis. Despite the Free Speech rights of
individuals, these rights may be curtailed based upon the location of the
speech5 29 or identity of the speaker.53 ° Case law involving these
limitations would most likely render a school policy unconstitutional.
Even if a graduation ceremony were considered a designated public
forum, 53 1 the state could readily articulate a compelling interest to curb
religious speech.532 In addition, the Court has greatly restricted student

963, 972 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that peer speech is not coercive when all students participate in
choosing to hear that type of speech).
524. See Adler, 174 F.3d at 1248.
525. See id. at 1244; see also Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1477.
526. But see Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated
on proceduralgrounds, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999); Clear Creek, 977 F.2d at 968.
527. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
528. See Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995).
529. See supra Part 1I.B.2.a (discussing the relevance of location and identity to application of
the Free Speech analysis).
530. See supra Part II.B.2.b (discussing the importance of the speaker's identity under the
Free Speech analysis).
531. See Ansson, supra note 46, at 3-6 (discussing public forum analysis in Free Speech doctrine).
532. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the emergence and development of the Lemon test).
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speech.5 33 Thus, normal Free Speech protections would not protect
534
state curtailment of speech.
1. Can a Graduation Ceremony Really Be a Public Forum?
A Free Speech analysis is invoked if speech is delivered within a
public forum. 535 Although schools and universities are not traditional
public forums such as a street or park, courts have considered them
designated or non-public fora. 536 In a case involving the access of
religious groups to a public school building, Justice O'Connor warned
that in its attempt to be sensitive to the clearly religious motivations for
such school policies, the Court must not ignore the fact that an authentic
open policy fails to endorse religious speech of any kind but instead
honors the free speech rights of student speakers. 537 Likewise, some
have argued that commencement exercises at a public high school could
reasonably qualify as a public forum. 538 In allowing students to speak
at graduation ceremonies, schools invite the public exchange that is
contemplated under Free Speech jurisprudence and express an intent to
create the fora required.53 9 One need only skim the papers to see that
5 n
controversial speakers often grace the podiums of such ceremonies.
The Santa Fe court, however, strongly disagreed 54 1 and remarked that

533. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988) (holding that a school
principal did not violate a student's First Amendment rights by censoring unapproved articles);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding that passive, nondisruptive political speech by a student was protected by the First Amendment).
534. See supra Part H.B.2 (discussing the limitations on the Free Speech doctrine).
535. See Allred, supra note 48, at 746.
536. See Ansson, supra note 46, at 25.
537. See Allred, supra note 48, at 773 (citing Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226
(1990)). This might be done through a disclaimer, but to censor the speech would infringe upon
Free Speech protections within the First Amendment. See id. at 775.
538. See Ansson, supra note 46, at 32 (noting the possibility of a broad group of student
speakers and the lack of interference of those speeches but noting that the traditional use of the
property does not compel public forum analysis). But see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994) (determining that a high school is not a public forum), rev'd, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Even though universities have been labeled public fora in certain circumstances, courts have distinguished secondary school classrooms on the basis of the
students' age and impressionability. See Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir.
1985) (finding that students in secondary schools are more susceptible to the mere appearance of
religious endorsement).
539. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (determining that a school newspaper was not a public forum and emphasizing that there must be
"clear intent to create a public forum").
540. See infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing the regulation of speech based on a speaker's identity).
541. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 821, 822 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
120 S. Ct. 494 (1999).
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graduation ceremonies do not elicit the sort of debate typical of public
fora. 542 The Court stated:
[They] created no forum at all and therefore could not, and did not,
trigger the First Amendment's prohibition of viewpoint
discrimination. The limited number of speakers, the monolithically
non-controversial nature of graduation ceremonies, and the tightly
restricted and highly controlled form of "speech" involved, all militate
against labeling such ceremonies as public fora of any type. Absent
feathers,
webbed feet, and bill, and a quack, this bird just ain't a
543
duck!

Even if a graduation ceremony were considered a designated public
forum, any restrictions on speech would be permissible if motivated by
a compelling state interest and, thus, would not be considered viewpoint
discrimination. 5" Some courts have argued that the compelling state
interest could be the Establishment Clause itself.545 The Court in
Widmar v. Vincent indicated that while a school's interest in complying
with the Establishment Clause might not overcome a Free Speech claim
in a university setting, the same might not hold true in a secondary
school. 546 It thus implied that the susceptibility of younger students to
the impressions of state speech might compel a stricter standard.5 47
If a graduation ceremony were only considered a non-public forum
and not a designated forum, a school district still might be able to curtail
religious speech. A non-public forum may be restricted if a regulation
is reasonably related to the intended purpose of the forum. 548 In
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, the
Court found that a neutral policy regarding student publications could
not restrict access based on religious content because the restriction was
not based upon the publication purpose of the policy. 549 Similarly, a
school might not be able to restrict religious speech based upon a
purpose dissimilar from the purpose of a graduation ceremony. 550 Two
factors, however, might overcome this parallel to Rosenberger. First of
all, secondary schools are generally afforded a greater ability to restrict

542. See generally Swanson, supra note 182.
543. Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 822.
544. See id.
545. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981).
546. See id. at 274 n.14. But see Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)
(drawing no distinction between university and secondary schools).
547. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274.
548. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
549. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995).
550. See id.

550
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speech. 55 1 Additionally, a school might be able to articulate a policy
that could maintain consistency with the ceremony itself and the
curtailment of religious speech.552
2. The Limits of Secondary Student Speech
Likewise, the line of cases looking at the speech rights of an
individual would compel a school policy unconstitutional. The opinions
in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District and
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier stand for the proposition that
school administrators have an interest in and broad discretion to control
55 3
student speech, which may be protected outside the walls of a school.
This discretion, however, may be exercised only if a threat of disruption
554
or inconsistency to the school's "pedagogical" purpose exists.
The Tinker and Kuhlmeier standards are distinguishable because of
the type of speech in question. 555 Graduation prayer would follow
under the Kuhlmeier standard, which considered the curricular speech
of student journalists. 556 Unlike the purely private expression
considered in Tinker, speech at a graduation ceremony may "bear the
imprimatur of the school. 55 7 Additionally, a graduation ceremony is
similar to other school events such as assemblies, which have been
considered quasi-curricular. 558 Thus, all one would need to do to
restrict religious speech is to articulate a legitimate pedagogical interest.
Great deference has been given to school districts when this standard
has been applied. 559 Thus, a school district could claim separation of
church and state, maintenance of the integrity of the graduation
ceremony, or any other such reason to curtail speech.
Even if Tinker were to apply, a graduation prayer policy would most
likely fail. One need look no further than the experience of Nick
Becker 56° to see that religious speech has the potential to cause the
"material" and "substantial" disruption considered impermissible in

551. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
552. See Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1120 (3d Cir. 1992).
553. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
554. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 289 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
555. See id. at 270-71.
556. See id. at 271.
557. Id.
558. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
559. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273 (requiring only a "legitimate" interest).
560. See supra Part I (discussing how Nick Becker's objection to religious speech at his
graduation ceremony sparked spontaneous audience prayer and led to his leaving in protest).
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Tinker.5 61 Such
speech may spark school and even community-wide
562
disruption.
V.

PROPOSAL

Despite the existing case law, the forms of analysis of student-led
prayer are unclear. As a result, in Stephensville, Texas, two students
defiantly snuck an amateur public address system into their school's
stadium in order to lead the fans in a pre-game prayer. 563 In Justin,
Texas, a student wishing to deliver a pre-game prayer "commandeered"
the press box public address system. 56 As the result of a temporary
injunction, Marian Ward is still allowed to deliver pre-game prayer in
Santa Fe, Texas, 565 but Nick Becker's parents sent him to visit566relatives
in another state in order to avoid the pressure of media scrutiny.
Without a clear directive from the United States Supreme Court, such
desperate practices will continue. Some have said that the public school
567
is the "most pervasive means of promoting our common destiny."
Without consistent school approaches toward religious speech, this
purpose of public education disappears. 56 8 The resolution of this issue
with sound judicial rationale will resolve a muddled area of First
Amendment jurisprudence and will spark a further judicial dialogue into
569
matters of church and state.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court will not prescribe a new analysis
during this term. 570 By only granting partial certiorari on the pre-game
prayer issue, the Court missed an important opportunity to contemplate
561. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
562. See id.
563. See Robert Bryce, To Pray-orNot to Pray, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 13, 1999, at
26.
564. See Hicks, supra note 1, at IA.
565. See id.
566. See Layton, supra note 8, at C2.
567. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948). Indeed, the
Court stated:
The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive
means for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of the State is it more vital to
keep out divisive forces than in its schools, to avoid confusing, not to say fusing, what
the Constitution sought to keep strictly apart. The great American principle of eternal
separation ... is one of the vital reliances of our Constitutional system for assuring
unities among our people stronger than our diversities. It is the Court's duty to enforce
this principle in its full integrity.
Id.
568. See id.
569. See Stockman, supra note 50, at 1836-37 (arguing for the resolution of the issue).
570. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 494 (1999).
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graduation prayer as well. 57 1 Although the Court has concluded that
school or clergy-led prayer at such traditional ceremonies is not
constitutionally valid, it has yet to rule on the role of student-led speech,
which is a common nation-wide practice. To defer on the issue of pregame prayer, the Supreme Court may only have the opportunity to rule
on a less common practice that will leave unaffected the scores of high
schools around the country that embrace student-led prayer at
graduation.
A. A Better Mode of Analysis
With the tension between the First Amendment Clauses in mind, a
comprehensive analysis of student-led graduation prayer issues must
include an exploration of Establishment Clause and Free Speech
principles. 5 72 This task is difficult because "the content-neutral thrust of
the Free Speech clause ... coexists uneasily with the special status of
religion under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses." 573 The
particular nature of student-led graduation school prayer compels such a
574
complex analysis despite this tension.
The application of the Free Speech Clause to the religious expression
of students requires an additional analysis because that expression
occurs under the guise of a state sponsored public school.57 5 Thus, an
additional Establishment Clause analysis is required.5 76 Yet, Free
Speech and Establishment Clause considerations must be balanced.
Such a two-step analysis will balance the duty of school districts to
restrict activity, which is tantamount to state support of religious
activity while also acknowledging the rights of expression held by
students.5 77
571. See id. ("Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit granted limited to the following question: Whether petitioner's policy permitting studentled, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause.").
572. See Ansson, supra note 46; see also Doe v. Santa Fe. Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806,
814 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.Ct. 494 (1999).
573. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115,
118 (1992) (stating that First Amendment prohibition is content-based discrimination).
574. See Ansson, supra note 46.
575. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting state action under the Establishment Clause).
576. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1256 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (discussing the state sponsorship of speech on school grounds).
577. Some schools have met this duty by including disclaimers in their graduation programs.
Compare ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd.of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1487 (3d Cir. 1996)
(holding that a disclaimer does not neutralize the implication of the Board's favoring the inclusion of such a prayer), with Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 453 (9th Cir. 1994)
(noting that the district court found very little state involvement in a process that allowed prayer
by relying on a disclaimer in a commencement program).
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As stated, a solid analysis must recognize the Free Speech rights of
students while being cognizant of the potential for state entanglement
with that speech.578 Simply put, the analysis should be concerned with
the potential for a reasonable audience member to look upon student-led
prayer as a government indoctrination rather than a private expression
of religious conviction. 579 Some have suggested that this sort of
"perception" based analysis 580 encompasses the different clauses of the
First Amendment and addresses the concerns of the Founding Fathers
while following the balancing act modern jurists have tried to
achieve. 58 1 This analysis recognizes the separation that guided early
a place for the
Establishment Clause analysis while also furrowing
582
accommodation of religiously neutral policies.
In order to balance the Free Speech rights of students while still
limiting governmental entanglement with religion, a sound analysis
should involve a consideration of two main factors: the nature of the
graduation ceremony forum 583 and the involvement of the school
administration in chosen speech. 584 Thus, a two-pronged analysis of
graduation prayer policies follows. The first prong requires a
determination of whether the graduation ceremony was a public
forum. 585 If a general graduation policy elicited speech from a wide
range of student speakers and outside guests, then arguably some could
argue that it could qualify as a designated public forum. 586 Moreover,
this type of graduation ceremony might be considered such a forum
because the school allowed a limited discourse on various topics to take
place on the school setting. 587 Even still, in such a forum the state is
allowed to restrict speech only if it articulates a compelling state interest
588
to do so.
578. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (discussing excessive entanglement).
579. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992) (discussing the coercive nature of
speech).
580. See Seide, supra note 148, at 386 (discussing the consideration of perception).
581. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 244-45 (discussing the intentions of the Framers regarding
the clauses of the First Amendment).
582. See generally Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (showing separation); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (showing accommodation).
583. See Allred, supra note 48, at 751.
584. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 586-87.
585. See, e.g., Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11 th Cir. 1999) (discussing forum
analysis in light of graduation school prayer).
586. See id.
587. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S 788, 802-804 (1985)
(discussing the formation of a limited public forum).
588. See id. at 800.
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Thus, the second part of the analysis requires a consideration of that
interest. Some have argued that the Establishment Clause may qualify
as that compelling interest.58 9 Under the resultant Establishment Clause
inquiry, then, the court should consider the potential sponsorship of
religious speech by the state. In order to determine such endorsement,
two additional factors need to be considered: the role of school
administration in reviewing student speech and the manner in which the
student speaker was chosen. 590 Through the first factor, school
administration cannot be permitted to prescribe or edit particular forms
of student speech. 591 Districts that did so violated the Establishment
Clause because the school districts were too involved in the
development and formation of religious speech.5 92 School districts
could avoid this by including a disclaimer in their graduation program
in anticipation of religious speech to separate student speech from
school-endorsement. Courts, however, are divided on whether such a
disclaimer would erase the imprimatur of the state. 593
In addition, the decision to include student prayer could not come
solely from a school administrator, otherwise it will be viewed as state
endorsement of religious expression. 594 Rather, students would have to
be involved by a democratic vote on the potential content of a particular
speech.5 95 Similarly, a school administrator could not select a student
speaker based upon religious beliefs or ask explicitly for a religious
speaker. Instead, a permissible policy would be defined by clear student
autonomy, from the selection of the speaker to the selection of the
6

content.

59

B. What Should Schools Do Now?
Although the above suggested test may provide a proper balance of
the involved interests, until there is a directive from the Supreme Court
or legislative guidance, school districts are left to independently
589. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-47 (1983).
590. This test is similar to Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), but does not define itself
with the ambiguity of themes like psychological and emotional coercion. See id. at 597-98 (setting forth a two-prong test: state sponsorship and coercion).
591. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1264-65 (11 th Cir. 1999).
592. See id. at 1265; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433 (1962).
593. See ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1487 (3d Cir. 1996);
Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 453 (9th Cir. 1994).
594. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1264 (discrediting school administration involvement).
595. See id.
596. See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832, 836-37 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated,
177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999); Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 968 (5th Cir.
1992). But see Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1487.
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evaluate the constitutionality of their student-led prayer graduation
policies. 597 The opinions discussed within this Comment suggest some
characteristics of a permissible school graduation policy. 598 For
example, the autonomy of student speakers has been an important
consideration of courts. 599 A school that chooses to draft or otherwise
advise on the content of student speech is likely to commit
Establishment Clause violations. 6° Undoubtedly, to pass constitutional
muster, students should have the freedom to deliver whatever sort of
speech they desire. 6° 1 This autonomy both embraces ideas of Free
6 2
Speech, but also avoids the risk of state establishment of religion. 0
Additionally, such a policy avoids the entanglement problems that
Justice O'Connor suggested were inevitable where there is invasive
monitoring to prevent religious speech. °3
Other smaller details will ensure a permissible policy. Although the
decisions were not unanimous on this point, some courts recognized a
disclaimer in a graduation program as an official state separation from
religious speech. 6°4 Another factor is the subjective intent of a school
policy. School districts should be careful when they articulate the
purpose or intent of a graduation prayer policy. 605 A number of courts
597. Some organizations have already set out guidelines for school districts:
School officials may not mandate or organize prayer at Graduation, nor may they organize a religious baccalaureate ceremony. If the school generally rents out its facilities
to private groups, it must rent them out on the same terms, and on a first-come, firstserved basis to organizers of privately sponsored religious baccalaureate services, provided that the school does not extend preferential treatment to the baccalaureate ceremony and the school disclaims official endorsement of the program. The courts have
come to conflicting conclusions under the federal Constitution on student- initiated
prayer at Graduation. Until the issue is authoritatively resolved, schools should ask
their lawyers what rules apply in their area.
Religion in the Public Schools: A Joint Statement of Current Law (visited Feb. 1, 2000)
<http://www.members.tripod.com/-candst/jnt-sta.htm>; see also ACLU Guidelines on School
Prayer, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERV., Sept. 26, 1999, at 13 ("The Lemon test states that in order to be constitutional, a [school graduation] policy must have a non-religious purpose; not end
up promoting or favoring any set of religious beliefs; and not overly involve the government with
religion.").
598. See supra Part II (discussing the Supreme Court's fluctuating focus on the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses).
599. See Madison, 147 F.3d at 836-37; Clear Creek, 977 F.2d at 968.
600. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1265 (11 th Cir. 1999).
601. See Madison, 147 F.3d at 836-37; Clear Creek, 977 F.2d at 968.
602. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1264; see, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962)
(noting impermissible state involvement).
603. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990).
604. See id. at 263 (Marshall, J., concurring).
605. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 816 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
120 S.Ct. 494 (1999); ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1478 (3d
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seemed to base their opinions almost solely upon the fact that a school
district was trying to fool others into believing that a religiously
motivated policy had a secular purpose. 6°6 A school must genuinely
invite neutral student speech in order to withstand an Establishment
Clause analysis. 607 Finally, a school policy must reflect a tone of simple
"toleration" of religious speech rather than explicit endorsement in
6°8
order to be found constitutional.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Such recommendations are certainly not a guarantee of
constitutionality because of the enormous inconsistencies among lower
courts. The Supreme Court missed an opportunity to resolve these
inconsistencies and give lower courts and school districts the means to
formulate constitutionally appropriate graduation prayer policies. Doe
v. Santa Fe Independent School District provided the Court with the
tools to craft a coherent directive on the issue of religious speech in
schools. In addition, the case presented a more global question for the
Court: whether student religious speech is more properly analyzed
under the Establishment Clause or the Free Speech doctrine. In sidestepping the question, however, the Court has left the Third, Fifth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in disagreement, both within and among
themselves. In turn, other circuit courts and lower courts are left to
wonder which circuit's reasoning best captures the constitutional
questions presented by the issue.
When the Court denied certiorari on the question of student-led
graduation prayer presented in Santa Fe, it left stagnant a body of law
and courts struggling to do justice to the original intent of the Framers
of the Constitution while following modem Supreme Court precedent.
The right of religious speech, although vexing, is one of the core values
of our society. Unfortunately, however, the Court has left the
boundaries of that right muddled, and has created more confusion than
clarity. Thus, students like Marian Ward and Nick Becker will continue
to test those boundaries in order to maintain the religious integrity that
the Constitution aimed to protect.
NANCY E. DRANE

Cir. 1996).
606. See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 816-17.
607. See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated, 177
F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999).
608. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 321, 977 F.2d 963, 968 (5th Cir. 1992)
(emphasizing the invitation for speech on general topics), vacated, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999).

